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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty knows 
how extremely expensive it is to be poor . . . .” 
–James Baldwin1 
 
The large number of Americans that do not use the traditional 
banking system is among the untenable economic conditions that the 2008 
financial crisis made more visible.2 In the United States, over a quarter of 
Americans are financially excluded from the traditional banking system and 
arguably economically unstable.3 Approximately 6.5 percent of American 
households are unbanked, and another 18.7 percent are underbanked.4 
 
1 James Baldwin, Fifth Avenue Uptown, ESQUIRE MAG., July 1960, at 70, 73.  
2 “Banking” as used in this Article refers to providing payment services and the mechanisms, 
e.g., cash, checks, credit cards, traveler's checks, letters of credit, and electronic fund 
transfers, used to transfer money from one person to another. See RICHARD S. CARNELL, 
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 65 
(6th ed. 2017) (defining banks as financial intermediaries that offer payment services); see 
generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 17 (2017), https://www. fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/ 
2017report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E AK-J7GD] [hereinafter 2017 FDIC SURVEY] (defining 
underbanked and unbanked populations by their use of alternative financial services (AFS) 
and their use or disuse of the banking system).  
3 See generally 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 17 (reporting that that 25.2 percent of 
surveyed Americans were unbanked or underbanked); Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 
21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 123 (2004) (explaining that individuals without bank accounts find 
it harder to save but are the ones who most need to be able to save). 
4 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 17. The survey classifies two different groups who 
do not use the formal financial services economy as the unbanked and the underbanked. 
Id. An unbanked household is one where no one in the household has a checking or savings 
account. Id. An underbanked household is one that uses alternative financial services 
providers, such as payday lenders, rent-to-own services, pawn shops, non-bank money 
orders, non-bank check-cashing services, non-bank remittances, or refund anticipation 
loans. Id.   
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Consumers, obviously,  are opting not to do banks,5 but the question is why.6  
For a myriad of sound reasons, underserved Americans use 
alternative financial services (AFS), or so-called fringe banks7, such as 
check cashers and payday lenders.8 Fringe banks are more accessible 
geographically, take into account consumers’ needs for immediate 
liquidity, and provide reliable products with transparent pricing.9 Fringe 
banks also offer high cost, destabilizing products and services which 
make it even more difficult for users to move into the financial 
mainstream.10 Financial services deregulation coupled with the market 
 
5 “We don’t do banks” is a common refrain in households that do not have bank accounts.  
ROURKE O’BRIEN, NEW AM. FOUND., “WE DON’T DO BANKS”: FINANCIAL LIVES OF FAMILIES 
ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 1 (2012), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3772-we-
dont-do-banks/RourkeMarch2012.280c7e858336448499de926c84038108.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/WQP8-L97W].  
6 See 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 4 (listing reasons why consumers were 
unbanked). Several academics have considered the issue of financial inclusion. See 
generally Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: 
Preserving the Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1217 (2004) (using contextual analysis to explain who exactly uses the alternative 
financial system and why); Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 
EMORY L.J. 483 (2013) (tracking the history of how the two-tier financial system came to 
be); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008) 
(arguing for increased regulation of the consumer credit industry); Barr, supra note 3 
(explaining the high cost of alternative financial systems on the poor); Richard R.W. 
Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994 (2006) (discussing the transaction costs 
of fringe credit reporting); Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer 
Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current 
Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589 (2000) 
(analyzing the rise of the two-tier financial services marketplace and warning that its rise 
could lead to a rising gap between the have and have-nots in society). Public policy reforms 
to attract consumers that do not participate in the formal banking system must take into 
account the reasons that consumers are financially excluded. 
7 Fringe banking is defined as “the arena of financial services that enables people with bad 
or no credit and without access to mainstream financial institutions to obtain money.” 
Mary A. Caplan, Communities Respond to Predatory Lending, 59 SOC. WORK 149, 149 
(2014). Clients of fringe bankers are also often referred to as the unbanked. Id. at 152. 
8 See JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND 
THE POOR 12-35 (1996) (discussing the fringe banking industry and how households use 
these alternative financial service providers). 
9 See Lisa J. Sevron & Antonieta Castro-Cosio, Reframing the Debate About Financial 
Inclusion: Evidence from an Up-Close View of Alternative Financial Services 24–26 (Mar. 
5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).   
10 See Sarah Ludwig, Credit Scores in America Perpetuate Racial Injustice. Here’s How. 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/13/your-
credit-score-is-racist-heres-why [https://perma.cc/4S7Y-DGGT] (detailing the consequences 
of using fringe bank products). Fringe bank users, who are primarily Black and Latino, are 
more likely to have damaged credit. Id.  
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development of asset-backed securitization have morphed the fringe 
banking market into a multibillion dollar market.11 
The two-tiered financial system of formal and informal banks is often 
justified based on rational choice, meaning individuals opt to use fringe banks.12 
Overwhelmingly, instead of opting out, the underbanked and unbanked are 
underserved by the traditional banking sector.13  Yet, financial inclusion––access 
to and participation in the formal banking economy––remains the primary way 
to enter the financial mainstream. The high transaction costs of check cashing 
and small-dollar credit potentially increase households’ financial distress, 
reducing borrowers’ creditworthiness and potentially decreasing their ability 
to obtain conventional credit and banking services.14 
Participation in the financial mainstream has macro and micro effects. 
Mainstream consumers are often financially stable and have economic 
mobility. They build wealth, acquire assets, establish credit, and obtain 
 
11 See MATT FELLOWES & MIA MABANTA, THE BROOKINGS INST., BANKING ON WEALTH: 
AMERICA’S NEW RETAIL BANKING INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS WEALTH-BUILDING POTENTIAL 
11 (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/research/banking-on-wealth-americas-new-retail-
banking-infrastructure-and-its-wealth-building-potential/ [https://perma.cc/77KJ-LNBZ] 
(“The $100 billion size of the high-cost non-bank basic financial services industry, including 
check cashers, payday lenders, and pawnshops, points to the high demand for basic financial 
services among low- and moderate-income customers.”).   
12 See O’BRIEN, supra note 5; see also 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 4. 
13 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 4. The deregulation of the banking industry in the 
early 1980s was disadvantageous to low-income consumers because small balance accounts 
were required to pay increased fees and charges for banking services. Efforts to mitigate the 
high costs of bank and nonbank services included legislation proposing universal access to 
bank accounts.  See H.R. 2661, 99th Cong. (1985) (requiring every federally insured depository 
institution to offer a basic account with no minimum balance, no fee for the first eight checks 
and the first five other withdrawals each month, and specified limits on other charges); H.R. 
2011, 99th Cong. (1985) (requiring federally insured depository institutions to offer at least 
type of account to those with less than $1000 on deposit). A joint regulatory statement 
also encouraged banks to offer low-cost basic banking services. BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. 
RESERVE SYS., JOINT POLICY STATEMENT ON BASIC FINANCIAL SERVICES (1986), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-2200.html#fdic5000jointps2 [https:// 
perma.cc/CB8T-GMF8].  
 14 See Kathryn Fritzdixon, Jim Hawkins & Paige Marta Skiba, Dude, Where’s My Car Title?: 
The Law, Behavior, and Economics of Title Lending Markets, 1103 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1041-
50 (2014) (outlining the psychological factors that relate to title lending and positing that the 
true costs of loans are often underestimated); Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do 
Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy?, 62 J.L. & ECON. 485, 486 (2019) (using statistical analysis 
to find a connection between the use of payday lending and higher rates of bankruptcy); see 
also Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan  Zinnman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military 
Personnel Performance, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2805, 2825–26 (2014) (positing that members of 
the armed services create or exacerbate financial problems by borrowing money).  
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affordable loans.15 They accumulate savings and have insurance to buffer a 
crisis.  Society benefits when individuals have the necessary tools to develop 
the skills needed to manage their resources and risks.16  A basic bank account 
is one such tool. 
While financial inclusion is easily recognized as a developmental 
priority in emerging countries, it is no less important in a developed country, 
such as the United States.17  Banks are integral to the proper functioning of a 
market economy.18  Banks  accept deposits and provide financial intermediation 
for consumers,19 Although fringe banks do not provide deposit accounts, 
 
15 Use of a bank account has been associated with an increase in savings, female 
empowerment and consumption, and productive investment of entrepreneurs. See Franklin 
Allen et al., The Foundations of Financial Inclusion: Understanding Ownership and Use of 
Formal Accounts 32–34 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 6290, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 348241468329061640/The-
foundations-of-financial-inclusion-understanding-ownership-and-use-of-formal-accounts 
[https://perma.cc/Q58H-Q7DY] (arguing for policies that reduce barriers to financial 
inclusion in order to encourage and promote financial inclusion). 
16 Broader access to bank accounts can have a positive effect on financial stability because 
increased financial intermediation results in lower transaction costs and increased dispersal of 
capital and risk across the economy. See Rui Han & Martin Melecky, Financial Inclusion for 
Financial Stability: Access to Bank Deposits and the Growth of Deposits in the Global Financial 
Crisis 16–17 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6577, 2013), https://open 
knowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16010 [https://perma.cc/BVB5-B7LQ] (concluding 
that policies promoting financial inclusion and the broader use of bank deposits can enhance 
overall financial stability as well as the financial system); see also Selahattin Selsah Pasali, 
Where Is the Cheese? Synthesizing a Giant Literature on Causes and Consequences of 
Financial Sector Development 5–6 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6655, 
2013), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/730041468152101741/pdf/WPS6655.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3HQJ-DXVC] (surveying literature on the financial sector and finding a 
positive relationship between financial development and economic growth and employment).  
17 One study cited the availability of alternatives to formal financial institutions as the 
primary difference between the United States and other developed countries. See Asli 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Leora Klapperm, Measuring Financial Inclusion: Explaining Variation 
in Use of Financial Services Across and Within Countries, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY, Spring 2013, at 279, 279–96 (2013) (studying developed and developing 
countries by measuring levels and patterns of use of different financial products and services 
globally and among different groups according to age, sex, and income among other factors 
which are collected in a World Bank financial inclusion database, “The Global Findex”). The 
United States lags significantly behind Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, countries 
with broadly similar economic development and legal traditions, but have well-developed, 
sustainable, financial inclusion policies.  Id.  
18 The Federal Reserve, as the central bank, has the regulatory authority to protect those not 
well served by our banking system. That responsibility seems even more compelling given 
the central bank’s financial assistance to investment banks during the subprime financial 
crisis. See discussion infra Part IV. 
19 Commercial Bank, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commercialbank. 
asp [https://perma.cc/3TJT-RRMC] (last visited Jan. 16, 2019).  
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consumers use them for check cashing, bill paying, and short-term loans. The 
high cost products and services of fringe banks are justified as filling a void in 
the regulatory system.20 To the contrary, fringe banking empowers financial 
exclusion and ultimately contributes to micro and macro financial instability.21  
This Article participates in the discourse about the efficacy of the 
financial regulatory system for unbanked and underbanked consumers.22  
While banking regulatory agencies recognize the value of diversity and 
inclusion in the banking economy, this aspirational vision has yielded few 
 
20 See LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES 
7 ( 2017) (describing the struggles of check casher patrons that result from failures in the bank 
system); see also What Is Driving The ‘Unbanking Of America’?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: FRESH 
AIR (Jan. 10, 2017, 1:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/10/509126878/what-is-driving-the-
unbanking-of-america [https://perma.cc/H9XE-QQ2N] (speaking to the idea that people who 
use alternative banking systems are making rational choices).  
21 See Ronald A. Wirtz, Will That Be Cash, Check or Debtor’s Hell?, FED. RES. BANK OF 
MINNEAPOLIS (Oct. 1, 2000), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/will-
that-be-cash-check-or-debtors-hell [https://perma.cc/3AFW-AN5K] (“Banks, for example, 
don’t typically make the $200 loans common among payday lenders. Given poor credit 
histories, credit cards can also be difficult to obtain (and, in fact, can be the original source 
of financial problems).”). As discussed infra Part III, there is statistical evidence that many 
U.S. citizens are excluded from formal financial services due to market failures. See also 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY 
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 10 (2012) (describing an IMF study that found a link between 
inequality and lower growth). But the high and positive growth rates in financial depth vary 
dramatically between developing and developed countries. See Financial Depth, THE 
WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/gfdr-2016/background/ 
financial-depth [https://perma.cc/H5LM-4FD2] (last accessed Aug. 3, 2020) (describing 
financial depth in relation to economic development). In the United States, a developed 
country, expanding financial inclusion is also significant for socio-economic development. 
See Financial Inclusion: A Challenge for Developing and Developed Countries, 
MICROWORLD.ORG (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.microworld.org/en/news-from-the-field/ 
article/financial-inclusion-challenge-developing-and-developed-countries [https://perma.cc/ 
EU5M-VLA6] (linking financial inclusion to social inclusion). While there is a strong 
correlation between not using the formal banking economy and income inequality, it is an 
erroneous assumption that those who do not use formal financial services are somehow 
constrained from participating in it. As discussed infra, statistics evidence that many U.S. 
citizens are excluded from formal financial services due to market failures.  
22 See Catherine Martin Christopher, Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked in 
America?, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 221, 231–43 (2016) (arguing mobile banking has high 
potential to transform the economic reality of the unbanked in America); see also Baradaran, 
supra note 6, at 509–10 (discussing the success of community development credit unions); 
Barr, supra note 3, at 124 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of alternative financial service 
providers); Aleta Sprague, Next Generation TANF: Reconceptualizing Public Assistance as a 
Vehicle for Financial Inclusion, 18 U.D.C. L. REV. 144, 164–74 (2015) (arguing for policy 
reforms that both remove access barriers and create entry points to the financial mainstream).  
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real improvements for under- and unbanked communities.23 The lack of a 
sustainable, financial inclusion policy has not only developed a robust fringe 
bank economy, but has embedded its operations in marginalized 
communities. In this regard, financial exclusion must be viewed within a 
framework that recognizes the systemic bias and exclusion inherent in the 
formal banking economy.24 To the extent that the banking regulatory system 
fails to provide access to basic banking services, it forces the economically 
marginalized into the informal banking system.  
Specifically, this Article proposes eliminating the structural barriers 
that exclude fringe bank consumers from the financial mainstream.25 This 
change in the regulatory and supervisory structure of financial institutions 
will mitigate the risks and the implementation costs of providing access while 
yielding significant micro and macroeconomic changes.26 
This Article makes three points. First, it contends that financial 
exclusion, through banking desserts and inadequate products and pricing, 
creates and maintains social and economic domination in low and moderate 
income (LMI) communities. Social Dominance Theory (SDT) informs the 
discussion of how the regulatory failure to promote and monitor financial 
inclusion supports the disparate, two-tier banking system.27 Second, this Article 
asserts that a transaction account is an essential financial service because it 
provides an individual with access to the payment system and is critical to 
 
23 See, e.g., About Us, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas. 
gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html [https://perma.cc/8ERX-3PCW] (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2019) (committing the OCC to “protecting consumers by making sure banks give fair 
access and equal treatment to customers and comply with consumer banking laws”). The Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), charters national banks and savings associations. 
Id.  The OCC is an independent bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Id.  
24  A society’s dominant group determines the economic and social benefits that the society’s 
subordinate group will receive, which in this case is access to the higher priced, less 
beneficial fringe banking system. See infra Section II.B.  
25 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). The most significant reform of the financial industry since the Great 
Depression, Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Id. at 
Title X. The CFPB uses its broad regulatory powers to regulate all consumer transactions 
including those provided by alternative financial service providers. Id.  
26 See generally ROBERT CULL, TILMAN EHRBECK & NINA HOLLE, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO 
ASSIST POOR, FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND DEVELOPMENT: RECENT IMPACT EVIDENCE 1 (2014), 
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/FocusNote-Financial-Inclusion-and-Development- 
April-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7SC-98VK] (summarizing findings about macro- and 
micro-economic changes that come from increased financial inclusion).  
27 Donald P. Morgan et al., Banking Deserts, Branch Closings, and Soft Information, LIBERTY 
STREET ECON. (Mar. 7, 2016), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/banking-
des erts-branch-closings-and-soft-information.html [https://perma.cc/476D-8XBW]. Social 
Dominance Theory recognizes that group-based hierarchies use legitimizing myths to allocate 
society’s goods and perpetuate inequalities. See infra Section II.B.  
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accessing other financial services, including savings accounts and credit lines.28 
Third, the pervasiveness of the payment system in a market economy dictates a 
sustainable regulatory response to address financial exclusion.29  
This Article concludes by proposing initial steps for a more appropriate 
regulatory approach to bring fringe bank consumers into the financial 
mainstream. It addresses the lack of a unified financial inclusion policy by 
proposing national goals with reporting requirements and awarding tax incentives 
to federally insured financial institutions that offer LMI transaction accounts.   
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II exposes the 
roots of fringe banking and the two-tiered banking system and presents 
financial exclusion as a socioeconomic system.30 It identifies market failures 
which resulted in banking exclusion and concludes by arguing that failure to 
have access to safe, secure, and affordable banking services constitutes 
socioeconomic domination.  
Part III argues that the fiscal financial linkage between payment 
processing and financial stability underlies the public benefit of banking. It also 
examines the existing and proposed models of financial inclusion and highlights 
similarities in approaches to addressing the issues of access to financial services 
for LMI consumers. Part III concludes by discussing the risks and 
implementation costs of changes to our regulatory and supervisory structure.31  
In light of the concerns discussed in previous sections, Part IV 
discusses the Federal Reserve’s responsibility to exercise its regulatory 
authority to address financial inclusion. Regulation promoting financial 
inclusion can ease the economic costs of providing entry to the formal 
 
28 “Essential financial services” are generally defined as the basic financial services essential 
to an individual’s daily needs. See Financial Services Sector, INVESTOPEDIA (July 7, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/030315/what-financial-services-sector.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/DDC5-LELL] (defining the term “essential financial services”). Essential financial 
services include: “a bank account to receive income; a transaction account to make payments 
from; a savings account to store money; and access to unsecured credit to manage temporary 
cash shortages and unexpected expenses.” STEFANIE LAMMERMANN, FINANCIAL EXCLUSION 
AND ACCESS TO CREDIT 26 (2010), http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/Eu_SW2010_ 
Financial_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA6P-9LCH]; see also Edward L. Rubin, The Lifeline 
Banking Controversy: Putting Deregulation to Work for the Low-Income Consumer, 67 IND. L.J. 
213, 221–30 (1992) (discussing a proposed “lifeline” checking account for low-income people to 
receive basic checking account services at a below market rate as a matter of social equity).  
 29 See generally MARIA CHIARA MALAGUTI, PAYMENT SYSTEM REGULATION FOR IMPROVING 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION 2, 4 n.2 (2015), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-Policy-
Paper-70-Malaguti-Payment-Systems-Financial-Inclusion-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS9A-N2 
7C] (“Payment and settlement systems thus play a crucial role in a market economy and 
central banks have always had a close interest in them as part of their responsibilities for 
monetary and financial stability.” (citation omitted)). 
30 See infra Part II. 
31  See infra Part III.  
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banking economy. It can also impede the private interests of fringe banks that 
thrive at the expense of LMI consumers. Specifically, Part IV proposes a two-
prong approach. First, banks must identify and report on financial inclusion 
goals as a part of their Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements. 
Second, to defray the costs of LMI transaction accounts, banks offering these 
accounts should receive tax incentives.  
Who has access to the formal banking economy is an issue of 
regulatory import. The dearth of affordable banking products and services 
specifically geared to LMI consumers transforms basic transaction accounts 
into luxury services that can only be afforded by a select few. The lack of 
choice and unequal access to financial products is the effect of a failed 
regulatory structure. Re-aligning the banking regulatory structure is 
imperative to correct the market’s inefficiencies and allow financial 
institutions an opportunity to both attract and serve those outside of the 
formal banking economy.  
 
I. DEFINING FINANCIAL EXCLUSION  
 
Financial exclusion, or a lack of access to the quality basic financial 
services which are essential to daily life, can occur at varying levels. 
Mainstream financial institutions offer essential financial tools and services, 
such as deposit and savings accounts, credit, and insurance.  By contrast, 
financial exclusion is recognized widely as a deterrent to economic and social 
integration. Marginalized groups that do not have access to certain   financial 
products do not appreciate their value. Financial access for financially 
vulnerable groups requires products with both structures and pricing that 
promotes financial stability. Without these products, marginalized groups are 
basically ousted from participating in the formal banking sector. 
 
A. The Two-Tiered Banking System  
 
Well-functioning financial systems offer savings, payment services, 
as well as credit and risk management to a high percentage of consumers and 
businesses.32 Those who are excluded rely instead on informal alternative 
financial services.33 
 
32 See Malaguti, supra note 29, at 2 (describing how a nation’s financial structure requires 
an infrastructure built on safety and soundness that consumers trust and perceive as fair). 
33See Barr, supra note 3, at 141–74 (describing the assortment of alternative financial 
services providers who make basic financial services available to low-income persons). 
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In 2009, an FDIC biennial survey began evaluating financial 
inclusion in the formal banking economy.34 The survey measured 
inclusiveness by determining the number of people who possess insured 
bank accounts in the previous 12 months.35 
The 2017 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households 
reported that 8.4 million or 6.5 percent of American households were 
“unbanked” or do not have a bank account.36 According to the FDIC, 24.2 
million or 18.7 percent of American households are underbanked.37 These 
consumers conduct their routine financial business, relying upon AFS in addition 
to, or instead of, traditional financial institutions.38 Together, these numbers 
reveal that 25.2 percent of American households were financially excluded in 
2017.39 
 
34 The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Conforming Amendment Act requires the FDIC to 
collect data biannually on the unbanked and underbanked and on traditional financial 
institutions' efforts to make traditional credit products available to them. Federal Deposit 
Insurance Reform Conforming Amendments Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-173, § 7(a)(1), 
119 Stat. 3601, 3609-10 (2006) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831z (2018)). The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) conducted the first study of the unbanked in 2002. According 
to that report, 51 percent of adults earning less than $15,000 per year and 36 percent of adults 
earning within the range of $15,000 to $30,000 per year were unbanked. See U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, GAO-02-913, Electronic Transfers: Use by Federal Payment 
Recipients Has Increased but Obstacles to Greater Participating Remain 57 (2002), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02913.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSZ2-WATV] (discussing the 
income groups of the underbanked). 
35 Published in 2009, this first survey, the FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked 
Households, found that approximately thirty million or 27.6 percent of U.S. households were 
either unbanked or underbanked, with 7.7 percent unbanked and 17.9 percent underbanked. See 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2009 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED 
HOUSEHOLDS 10 (2009), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2009/full_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3EF8-6KFL] [hereinafter 2009 FDIC SURVEY] (discussing statistical data 
regarding national, state, and local banking rates). 
36 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 1. As the survey notes, this number may be an 
underestimate because it does not account for “banked” household residents who do not 
have an account in their name and do not benefit from a bank account owned by another 
household resident. 
37 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 17.   
38 Most U.S. households (68.4 percent) were “fully banked” in 2017, meaning that the 
household had a bank account and did not use AFS in the past twelve months. 2017 FDIC 
SURVEY, infra note 2, at 1–2, 36. A total of 25.2 percent was unbanked and underbanked. Id. 
The remaining 6.3 percent of U.S. households had a bank account, but information on their 
use of AFS was insufficient to categorize the household as either underbanked or fully 
banked (i.e., banked, underbanked status unknown). Id. 
39 This compares with 28.3 percent or 68 million adults living in underbanked or unbanked 
households in 2011. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP, 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2012), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2011/2011_ 
unbankedreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSL2-WTTK] [hereinafter 2011 FDIC SURVEY].  
Vol. 5:4]          Doin’ Banks 
 
71 
The 2017 survey shows a decline in the unbanked rate “to the lowest 
level since the survey began in 2009”; the underbanked number remains 
largely constant.40 Only 6.5 percent of the population is unbanked, a record 
low representing a significant improvement over the all-time high of 8.2 
percent in 2011.41 The underbanked, or the number of U.S. households that 
have a bank account, but do not use the banking system to meet transaction 
or credit needs is relatively unchanged since the survey began in 2009 when it 
was 7.6 percent.42 The survey showed 20.1 percent as underbanked in 2011.43 
Underserved banking customers are excluded for a myriad of reasons 
ranging from lack of geographic access and transparency to poor credit.44  
Yet, the study’s demographics are enlightening, although not surprising.45 
Minorities and LMI consumers are disproportionately represented in the 
unbanked and underbanked categories.46 The 2017 survey confirms, as in the 
past, that access to formal financial services is skewed towards whites and 
the well-educated, while informal financial services are skewed towards 
minorities and the less-educated.47 Geographically, there is more financial 
exclusion in the southern part of the United States, whose demographics 
encompass more people of color with less education.48 
While the FDIC survey identifies that unbanked consumers do not use 
bank accounts because of “lack of money,” academic research has yielded 
more specificity. LMI consumers identified their preference for AFS based 
on the simplicity and convenience of the products as well as the convenience 
of “bank” hours and locations.49  The limited transaction services and lack of 
 
40 See 2017 FDIC SURVEY, note 2, at 1 (reporting banking statistics for U.S. households).  
41 Id. at 17. 
42 Id. 
43 2011 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 41, at 3. For official FDIC reports, surveys, and other 
related documents, see Surveys & Data, ECONOMICINCLUSION.GOV, http://www.economic 
inclusion.gov/surveys/ [https://perma.cc/6YZK-Q5HP] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020). 
44 Unbanked households reported not having a checking or savings accounts because they 
did “[n]ot ha[ve] enough money to feel they need[ed] an account.” 2009 FDIC SURVEY, 
supra note 37, at 11, 20–25. 
45 The GAO Survey found that 17 percent of adults earning at least $45,000 per year were 
banked and that 69% of unbanked consumers had a high school education or less. See U.S. 
Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 34, at 57–58 (offering a graph that displays these 
numbers). 
46 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 2. 
47 2009 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 44, at 10–11. 
48 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 22. 
49 While some LMI consumers prefer AFS, the undertow of participating in that financial 
system is the inability of LMI consumers to accumulate both short-and long-term savings. 
Barr’s Study concludes: “[t]he results [of the study] suggest that existing financial services, 
credit, and payment systems impose high transaction costs on lower-income households, 
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savings services limit AFS providers from seeing the client as needing more 
than a check cashing service.  This highlights the need for banks to have the 
appropriate products and services for this particular clientele. 
 
1. Geographic Exclusion—Bank Deserts  
  
“Bank deserts” are geographical areas without bank branches in a 10-
mile radius.50 The lack of access to banks also means a lack of access to 
mainstream financial products, such as mortgages and small business loans, 
savings accounts and lower-cost credit. To determine the presence of banking 
deserts, zip codes are compared in terms of bank branches, race and ethnicity, 
poverty, income, and population.51 Identifying a banking desert requires 
integrating annual, geocoded data on bank branches from the FDIC with 
tract-level data on household income and race from the 2000 census.52  
Residents of banking deserts are then characterized according to the share of 
the population which is low income, meaning annual income of $30,177 or 
less (the bottom quartile in 2000 dollars) and majority-minority, meaning that 
more than 50 percent of the population is Black or Hispanic.53 
Common demographic characteristics define banking deserts, 
whether located in urban or rural areas. A recent study examining post-
recession bank closures evaluated the locations of FDIC-insured bank 
branches in relation to U.S. Census Bureau data on households’ income 
and race. Under this analysis, a banking desert is a “census tract[] in which 
there are no bank branches within a 10-mile radius from the tracts’ 
centers.”54  Statistically, a banking desert has less than .02 branches per 
1,000 residents, or less than one-tenth of the mean.55 The average poverty 
 
increase their costs of credit, and reduce their opportunities to save.” MICHAEL S. BARR, NO 
SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 8 (2012).  
50 One study defined bank deserts as having .02 bank branches in an urban area per 1,000 
residents, when the average is 10 times greater. Russell D. Kashian et al., Banking the 
Unbanked: Bank Deserts in the United States 6, 8 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://swfa 
2015.uno.edu/F_Banking/paper_90.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9WQ-LK25]. The designation of a 
geographical area as a bank desert is based on the overlap between household income and race, 
using U.S. Census Bureau data, and the location of FDIC-insured banks. Morgan et al., supra 
note 28.  There is a strong correlation between household income and race. Kashian et al., 
supra note 52, at 8–10.   
51 Id. at 6–7. 
52 Id. at 5.  
53 “The maximum for this quartile is $49,626 in urban areas (inside a metropolitan statistical 
area or MSA) and $46,095 in rural areas (outside an MSA).” Drew Dahl & Michelle Franke, 
“Banking Deserts” Become a Concern as Branches Dry Up, REG’L ECONOMIST, Second 
Quarter 2017, at 20. 
54 Id.  
55 Kashian et al., supra note 52, at 6.  
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rate is higher than the overall average and average household per capita 
income is lower.56 A separate study concluded that the disparity of urban 
bank branch closings means “that residents of low-income census tracts 
are eighty percent more likely to live in a banking desert than are residents 
of higher-income tracts.”57 Similarly, rural areas disproportionately lost 
more access to financial services.58  
A further concern is how bank deserts might expand. A different study 
projected the location of new deserts if existing, isolated bank branches close.59  
Under this classification, merging the race and income identifiers with zip 
codes, there were 1132 deserts in existence at the end of 2014, with a potential 
for 1055 additional deserts.60  The location of future deserts is based on out-of-
the-way branches, or those outside the ten-mile range of any others.61 The 
projected closures would specifically impact smaller, community banks.62  
Bank deserts have a spillover effect; households and communities are 
unable to leverage financial products and services to their advantage. 
Accessing credit, such as mortgages and small business loans, builds wealth 
of individuals and businesses and affects the economic mobility and the 
economic development of a community.63 Particularly in LMI 
neighborhoods, relationship banking or knowledge of the community is 
crucial in lending decisions. Studies on relationship banking in LMI 
neighborhoods have found that the presence of bank branches affects both 
credit availability and positive loan performance.  
The physical presence of a lender in the neighborhood mitigates risk 
and expands credit availability.64 The presence of bank branches is a favorable 
 
56 Id. at 8. 
57 NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., BANK BRANCH CLOSURES FROM 2008-2016: UNEQUAL 
IMPACT IN AMERICA’S HEARTLAND (2017), https://ncrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ 
NCRC_Branch_Deserts_Research_Memo_050517_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JFZ-G2UQ] 
58 Id. at 10. 
59 Dahl & Franke, supra note 55, at 20. 
60 Id.  
61  See generally Morgan et al., supra note 28, at 20 (describing “[b]ank desert expansion 
and its impact on minority groups).  
62 Dahl & Franke, supra note 55, at 20 (explaining that “branches in potential deserts are 
small, with median deposits of $23 million in urban areas and $20 million in rural areas . . . 
. [and] operated by small banks, with median total assets of $776 million in urban areas and 
$317 million in rural areas”).  
63 Cf. O. Emre Ergungor, Bank Branch Presence and Access to Credit in Low-to-Moderate 
Income Neighborhoods 4, 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 06-16, 
2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951197 [https://perma.cc/9BV6- 
JP4D] (positing that for some borrowers in low-income neighborhoods, collection of soft 
information is more meaningful than credit scores in assessing creditworthiness). 
64 O. Emre Ergungor & Stephanie Moulton, Do Bank Branches Matter Anymore?, 13 ECON. 
COMMENTARY 1, 5 (2011). 
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indicator of the investment potential and entrepreneurship of a community as 
well as the potential for more financial resources and opportunities.65  
The lack of access created by banking deserts causes high transaction 
costs for basic financial services. As discussed below, whether the pricing, 
product design, and delivery offered to LMI consumers are appropriate for 
their needs is a crucial area of inquiry in assessing financial exclusion.  
 
2. Pricing, Product Design, and Delivery  
 
In addition to geographical access, use of transaction banking services 
for LMI consumers is also made more difficult due to product design, 
delivery, and pricing. All consumers use the same payment system and have 
credit needs. Broadening access to the formal banking economy requires 
recognizing that the pricing, product design, and marketing of services that 
have an appropriate, flexible quality will encourage actual usage.  
Financial inclusion as it relates to product design encompasses both 
usage and quality. Banks traditionally design products for households that 
receive a moderate income on a regular basis.66  Financial providers and 
products need to be specifically tailored to the needs of LMI consumers in 
order to manage the risk of what is in essence a non-traditional borrower.67  
 
65 See id. at 1 (arguing that especially in low and moderate-income neighborhoods, there is a 
positive correlation between local bank branch access, and credit availability for small business 
lending); see also Hoai-Luu Q. Nguyen, Do Bank Branches Still Matter? The Effect of 
Closings on Local Economic Outcomes 1 (Dec. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/10143 [https://perma.cc/6TJY-3S8E] (examining the prolonged 
negative effects of bank branch closings on credit supply to local small businesses). 
66 Barr, supra note 51, at 4. The size and volume of the fringe banking industry continues to 
expand, as described in a recent report, which notes: 
According to a 2003 study by John P. Caskey, a Swarthmore College 
economics professor, the number of check-cashing outlets grew from 1202 
in 1986 to 16,689 in 1993. The annual revenues of ACE Cash Express, one 
of the nation’s largest providers of alternative financial services, grew 
nearly ten-fold in the decade from 1992 to 2002, from $26 million to just 
shy of $230 million. According to industry figures, check-cashing outlets 
now process nearly 180 million checks per year, with an estimated face 
value of $55 billion. 
NATIONAL CMTY. REINVESTMENT FUND, FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM, A GUIDE TO 
BUILDING PRODUCTS AND STRATEGIES FOR UNDERBANKED MARKETS i (2008), 
https://ncif.org/sites/default/files/free-publications/RFSI_StretegyGuide_Complete.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3DEG- BMRG]. 
67 Bank customer identification rules require including verification through the use of a 
variety of well-established, permissible forms of identification. See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 
(2020). These identification requirements necessary to open a transaction account exclude 
some LMI consumers from having a basic deposit account or a savings account. See Barr, 
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Financial exclusion is a problem of supply and demand with risk 
assessment being a key component. Lenders segment markets according to  
risk when designing products. The challenge of risk segmentation for higher 
risk customers in a way that appropriately assesses risk, but is also transparent 
and non-discriminatory, is two-fold.68 
The supply and demand aspects of financial inclusion have micro and 
macro aspects. Low-cost accounts, variety among financial service providers, 
and governmental policies encouraging inclusion are all necessary to bring 
the underserved into the formal banking economy.69 Finding the balance 
between the costs of constructing the financial products which excluded 
consumers need and the sustainability of those products is integral. 
The paucity of adequate products and services demonstrates the 
narrow aspects of the supply problem. Financial providers and products also 
need to be specifically tailored to the needs of LMI consumers in order to 
rebut the notion that banks are not for the poor.  Monthly charges, minimum 
balances, as well as overdraft fees and charges are costs and penalties that are 
a part of product design.70 Product availability based on income, geographical 
location of bank branches, and even lack of branch branches in 
neighborhoods reinforce negative attitudes and stereotypes about the 
availability of banks to LMI consumers.  
Financial capability, or the knowledge, skill and confidence of 
consumers, affects the demand for LMI consumer products. Individuals’ 
norms and beliefs affect their choices about using a transaction account or 
establishing a formal banking relationship. Financial exclusion and isolation 
 
supra note 3, at 184 (describing the impact of identity document requirements on low-income 
immigrant communities); see also Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: 
What We Can Learn from the Banking and Credit Habits of Undocumented Immigrants, 
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989, 1042 (explaining that undocumented immigrants are often 
weary of formal banking institutions). I should add, however, that banks can and do require 
information not required by the FDIC rules.   
68 The first issue is how to not overly advantage low-risk customers, who benefit from a 
positive presumption because of their account status or a personal relationship between the 
banker and the customer. See Aluma Zernik, Overdrafts: When Markets, Consumers, and 
Regulators Collide, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 24 (2018).  
69 See generally Allen et al., supra note 15 (discussing the role of financial inclusion policy 
to broaden access for those financially excluded from the market). 
70 There is no requirement that banks offer low-cost accounts to consumers, but the FDIC 
initiated an optional Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program to encourage banks to offer profitable, 
affordable small-dollar loans. FDIC Model Safe Accounts Pilot, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/template/ [https://perma.cc/38YD-DGME] (last updated 
Apr. 25, 2012).  
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occur because the norms and expectations of consumers are not met.71  Lack 
of familiarity with appropriate financial products and services often results in 
financial exclusion. LMI consumers are not able to make the best use of 
available products when financial pressures occur if they are unaware of them.  
Financial capability also encompasses the complexity of financial 
products.72 The jargon, terms in fine print, and varying interest rates require 
a level of financial judgment and understanding. Transparency and ease when 
doing banking transactions are prerequisites for full participation in the 
formal banking economy.73  
Finally, whether race or risk is predominant in product pricing and 
marketing by banks can be difficult to assess given the overlap of income and 
race in this country. The lack of trust and aversion that minorities, regardless 
of income, have towards the formal banking system is directly related to this 
country’s sordid history of regulated, discriminatory lending.74 Admittedly, 
banks incur increased delivery costs when providing affordable, inclusive 
financial products. However, the effectiveness of a financial system is based 
on the range of financial products for savings, credit, and risk management 
offered as well as the wide range of people and businesses served.75 As 
discussed below, to ignore the need for governmental regulation to create an 
 
71  For background on why individuals might opt to use check cashing services instead of 
formal banking accounts, see Gillian B. White, Why Poor People Make Expensive Financial 
Decisions, ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/ 
01/underbanked-servon/513542/ [https://perma.cc/4GEK-LZMJ] (reviewing Lisa Servon’s 
book, which “explains how changes to both the banking system and the economy inhibited 
many Americans from accessing basic necessities and building strong financial 
foundations”); see also Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow TM: 
Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164, S167 
(2004) (outlining three reasons why households have difficulty saving: the difficulty of 
determining the proper savings rate, lack of self-control, and procrastination).  
72 For background on the “financial capability” as a framework, see generally FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH. INV’R EDUC. FDN., THE STATE OF U.S. FINANCIAL CAPABILITY: THE 2018 
NATIONAL FINANCIAL CAPABILITY STUDY 1 (2019), https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/down 
loads/NFCS_2018_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/96ES-4XEA].   
73 See Austin, supra note 6, at 1247–50 (discussing the cultural perceptions that low-income 
consumers have regarding mainstream financial institutions).  
74 See Brooks, supra note 6, at 997–98 (describing the disparities in credit access on the basis 
of race and class that have emerged in communities where fringe lending is prevalent). 
75 See generally Asli Demigruc-Kunt, Leora Klapper & Dorothe Singer, Financial Inclusion 
and Inclusive Growth: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence 18–19 (World Bank Grp. 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 8040, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958542&download=yes [https://perma.cc/2K7X-TMCK](finding 
that, while financial inclusion is especially beneficial to the poorest income levels, that 
advantage is directly tied to whether the financial infrastructure accommodates small 
financial transactions).  
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efficacious, inclusive financial system is to sanction the systematic 
subordination that financial exclusion creates.76 
  
B. Financial Exclusion as Economic Subordination 
 
Access to credit is protected by prohibitions against discriminatory 
conduct.77 What antidiscrimination laws do not guarantee is a right of access 
to the formal banking sector. Those laws fail to address the systematic bias 
and exclusion inherent in the formal banking economy. To the extent that the 
banking regulatory system fails to provide access to even basic banking 
services, it forces us to consider the systemic reasons why minorities who are 
economically marginalized are consistently pushed into the informal banking 
system. There is largely broad indifference to this state of affairs. 
One explanation for the broad indifference that encourages fringe 
banking and hampers financial inclusion is that there is societal discrimination 
against blacks who are also often economically marginalized. Psychologists 
argue that the persistence of social inequality is due to the way in which 
dominant social groups protect existing advantages and disadvantages.78 SDT 
enlightens the discussion on how the regulatory failure to promote and monitor 
financial inclusion supports the disparate, two-tier banking system.79 Its group 
rights approach is also instructive regarding individual discrimination.  
Using SDT’s labeling, the banking regulatory system allows 
mainstream banks to be financially exclusive. This makes mainstream 
banking consumers and, implicitly, the regulatory framework, the dominant 
group and fringe bank consumers are the subordinate group. The theory posits 
that the society’s dominant group determines the economic and social 
 
76 Franklin, supra note 15 (“[Poor and rural residents] report lower barriers in countries with 
lower costs of accounts and greater penetration of financial service providers.”). 
77 Fair lending laws guard against the bias that may occur in lending. The Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA) specifies several protected classifications that may not be the basis 
for a credit decision, with the lender facing liability in compensatory and punitive damages. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2018) The Fair Housing Act, (FHA) also establishes protected 
classes in housing-related lending activities. The FHA, a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
makes it unlawful for any lender to discriminate against any persons because of their race, 
color, religion, national origin, handicap, family status, or sex in the sale or rental of housing. 
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2018). 
78 See Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius & Shana Levin, Social Dominance Theory and The 
Dynamics of Intergroup Relations: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 17 EUR. REV. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 271, 272 (2006) (theorizing that all societies tend to be structured into group-based 
hierarchies from which power and authority are distributed based on legitimizing myths). 
79 “Financial exclusion is deeply interrelated with social exclusion. . . . Those unable to 
access finance for enterprise development or personal consumption have greater difficulties 
in integrating socially and economically.” Lammermann, supra note 28, at 27. 
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benefits that the society’s subordinate group will receive.80 Existing social 
hierarchies result in a competitive dynamic that controls economic and social 
benefits. The dominant group through oppositional asymmetric behavior 
continually adjusts and redefines its power to adapt to the changing 
conditions.81 By creating legitimizing myths, or “collective narratives,” the 
dominant group allocates society’s goods and in doing so justifies group 
domination and perpetuates inequalities.82  
The legitimizing myth arising out of racial discrimination and 
economic marginalization is that fringe banks provide sufficient financial 
intermediation and access to the payments system. Characterizing the issue of 
access to safe, reliable intermediation as one of individual choice, cultural 
preferences, or market efficiency ignores the economic discrimination faced 
by fringe bank consumers.83 The burden of the increased costs and risks of non-
access are borne by those consumers.84 Access to effective intermediation is 
both beneficial and essential because it is difficult, if not unmanageable, to 
transact economic activities without access to suitable payment systems.  
Financial inclusion quantifies the efficiency of a country’s payment 
system. That efficacy depends on the diversity and depth of economic groups 
served. The result is that in this country, access to the formal banking 
economy is reserved for the society’s dominant group, while the society’s 
subordinate group is relegated to the higher priced, less beneficial fringe 
banking system. Upon examining the demographics, it becomes clear that the 
social groups most subjected to financial exclusion are black and poor people. 
The demographics of financial exclusion put race and class at the core 
of unequal treatment. A disproportionate number of those outside the formal 
economy are people of color.85 It is hard to ignore the impact of prior racial 
 
80 Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, supra note 72, at 273. The dominant and subordinate groups are 
based on age, gender, and arbitrarily socially constructed characteristics, such as race, 
ethnicity, and class. Id. 
81 Hierarchical societies have social value demarcations and distribute the society’s benefits 
according to the groups’ ranking. Group members derive advantages and disadvantages 
based solely on their placement. Dominant groups have positive social value, e.g., political 
authority and power, while subordinate groups have negative social value, or low power. Id. 
at 272. 
82 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: 
A Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 8 (2015). 
83 Unlike in developing countries where financial inclusion is often needed to stabilize the 
economy, in developed countries, financial inclusion is a byproduct of efficiency. Malaguti, 
supra note 29, at 2. 
84 See Eric Yaverbaum, Financial Exclusion: Why the Poor Get Poorer, HUFFPOST (Apr. 6, 
2015, 8:15 PM ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/financial-exclusion-why-the-poor_ 
b_7001914 [https://perma.cc/9L7T-42JZ] (“The average full-time worker without a bank 
account can spend $40,000 over the course of his or her lifetime just to cash paychecks”).  
85 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 2–3.  
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discrimination on the development of the two-tier system.86 This racially 
disparate pattern of providing little to no alternative to fringe banking 
contributes to the economic insecurity of people of color within the United 
States. The troubling role of race as evidenced in the financial exclusion 
statistics shows the impact that is felt by historically marginalized groups. 
Thus, the failure of law and policy to ameliorate that exclusion is of concern. 
Without a policy mandate, these consumers remain invisible to the deeply 
established, highly competitive banking system.87  
Banking law can enable or reduce social domination.88 In this instance, the 
banking regulatory structure sustains the pre-existing group-based inequality by 
not providing competitive financial intermediation or access to the payment 
system for LMI consumers. The mainstream banking economy demonstrates that 
competition alone does not provide the essential level of payment systems to all 
segments of society. In fact, the regulatory scheme legitimizes anti-competitive 
conduct by failing to provide suitable institutions for LMI consumers. United 
States policy initiatives have not resulted in concrete measures that increase the 
supply of accessible products, services or locales for fringe bank consumers.89 
 
86 For example, a report describes “economic insecurity as a norm and security as an exception” 
among retirees of color “just 8 percent of African-American senior households and only 4 percent 
of Latino senior households are economically secure with sufficient resources to maintain a basic 
standard of economic security throughout their projected life expectancy.” TATJANA MESCHEDE, 
LAURA SULLIVAN & THOMAS SHAPIRO, THE CRISIS OF ECONOMIC INSECURITY FOR AFRICAN-
AMERICAN AND LATINO SENIORS 2 (2011), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files 
/publications/IASP%20Demos%20Senior%20of%20Color%20Brief%20September%202011.p
df [https://perma.cc/L5W6-6W2U]. See also Laura Sullivan et al., Equitable Investments in the 
Next Generation: Designing Policies to Close the Racial Wealth Gap, CFED (2016), 
https://prosperitynow.org/sites/default/files/resources/IASP_CFED_Equitable_Investments_in_ 
the_Next_Generation-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3UB-PJEP]; Amy Traub, Laura Sullivan, 
Tatjana Meschede & Tom Shapiro, The Asset Value of Whiteness: Understanding the Racial 
Wealth Gap, DEMOS (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.demos.org/publication/asset-value-whiteness-
understanding-racial-wealth-gap [https://perma.cc/GD88-ZFVT].  
87 See generally, Cassandra Jones Havard, Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When 
Sub-Prime Lending Becomes Predatory, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1057, 1061–71 (2001) 
(arguing that consumers who are invisible to the traditional banking system are forced into 
predatory and sub-prime loans which do not accurately price their credit risk).  
88 As one scholar posits:  
Law is an important instrument of social domination. Constitutional law 
doctrines, for example, make it extremely difficult for persons of color 
to challenge racial discrimination, but impose few barriers for whites 
who wish to contest the legality of racial egalitarian remedies. 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position: Social   
Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 32 (2014). 
89 The FDIC has endorsed small dollar loans as a viable bank product. See FDIC Model Safe 
Accounts Pilot, supra note 67. The regulatory agencies theoretically allow federally insured 
institutions to offer deposit advance loans as an alternative to payday loans. See 78 Treas. 
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Access to basic banking services unfairly advantages those who 
readily have them while disadvantaging those who are affected by 
systematic anti-competitive conduct.90 If the limited access to mainstream 
banking services is viewed as an exercise of monopoly power, the 
anticompetitive dynamic of the fringe banking sector is more visible. 
Indubitably, the regulatory void stridently endorses the structurally unfair and 
noncompetitive two-tiered banking framework.    
The two-tier banking system is anticompetitive in at least two ways. 
First, fringe banking consumers have “barriers to entry.”91 The formal 
banking economy is less attractive to fringe bank consumers because of the 
risks and size of the investment to enter the market. Product design makes it 
expensive for fringe bank consumers to invest in the formal banking economy 
compared to the return on their investment. Risk analyses that are more 
appropriate for higher-income sector customers should be replaced with the 
type of nonstandardized risk analysis appropriate for fringe bank consumers 
making this transition.92 Requiring standardization on disclosure 
transparency, sustainability, appropriate risk evaluations and consumer 
protection are the type of minimal requirements that are not only beneficial 
but should be the norm for consumers transitioning into the formal 
economy.93 Allowing consumer choice and monitoring regulatory costs 
 
Reg. 70624 (2013); 78 Treas. Reg. 70552 (2013).The regulations make the products unduly 
restrictive. To qualify for a deposit advance loan, the customer must 1) have a deposit 
account with the bank for at least six months and 2) not have delinquent or adversely 
classified credits. See 78 Treas. Reg. at 70629; see also 78 Treas. Reg. at 70556. 
90 Although “[s]ocial dominance theory's key insight is its emphasis on the individual-level 
forces that contribute to the perpetuation of group-based social hierarchies.” Michelle 
Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 1089, 1108 (2002). The theory is used by analogy in this Article as a way of explaining 
the collective failure of law and policy to recognize how the inequality among social groups 
results in a noncompetitive banking environment for LMI consumers.  
91 “Barriers to entry,” which can include governmental regulation, are anticompetitive 
measures that disrupt other firms from entering a market that is dominated by a firm in the 
market earning competitive prices. Caskey, supra note 8, at 150.  
92  Relationship lending, which is popular in microfinance, uses nontraditional factors, 
including “soft” information to assess risk. See generally Craig R. Everett, Group 
Membership, Relationship Banking and Loan Default Risk: The Case of Online Social 
Lending, 7 BANKING & FIN. REV. 15, 15 (2015).  
93 The CFPB has authority to review financial product to ensure that they are fair, transparent 
and competitive. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2018) (authorizing the CFPB to “implement and, 
where applicable, enforce federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of 
ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and 
services and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, 
and competitive”); see also Norman I. Silber, Reasonable Behavior at the CFPB, 7 BROOK. 
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 87, 104 (2012) (discussing the expansiveness of the CFPB’s role is 
in protecting consumers). 
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should stimulate competition in the market.94 Second, fringe banking forces 
a “lock-out.” The structure of the informal economy is self-perpetuating in 
that it undermines customers’ ability to move into the formal banking 
sector.95 There is ineffective competition from mainstream banks to provide 
services to fringe bank customers which by default encourages fringe banking 
consumers to enter the informal banking system and arguably keeps them 
there. However, while having a number of providers in a market is a 
necessary condition for effective competition, a robust market does not assure 
automatically that the market is effectively competitive for customers.  
Individual consumers do not have a legal right to challenge the 
regulatory structure that excludes them.96  Essentially, fringe bank consumers 
have an absence of choice.97 The ineffective competition to provide services 
to fringe bank customers raises problems with supply.  The lack of diversity 
among fringe bank providers, when left unchallenged, deters potential 
entrants from entering the market. Fringe banks can then raise prices, limit 
quality, or restrict product availability.98 Moreover, to the extent that the 
 
94 Fringe bank customers need nonstandardized risk analysis instead of risk assessments which 
are appropriate for higher-income sector customers. Shahram Sharifi & G. Michael Flores, 
Options for Short-Term Credit in the United Kingdom 13–15 (May 4, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2259542 [https://perma.cc/ 
P5BD-9ETE] (discussing the higher costs of offering bank products to LMI consumers). 
95 Access to transaction accounts leads to the necessary information for lenders to assess 
creditworthiness. To the contrary, the structure of the fringe banking market “undermines 
consumers’ access to alternative low-cost credit.” Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 997 (2006); see also Drysdale & Keest, supra note 6, at 666 
(describing fringe loans as “go[ing] up a descending escalator—the fringe customer has to 
fight hard just to stay in place, and stopping for breath means a ride to the bottom.”).  
96 In the United States, unlike in the European Union, there is no right to a basic bank 
account.  American consumers who are financially excluded have no way to remedy their 
financial exclusion without laws that change the regulatory structure as discussed in Part 
III. See, e.g., Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
July 2014 on the Comparability of Fees Related to Payment Accounts, Payment Account 
Switching and Access to Payment Accounts with Basic Features, 2014 O.J. (L 257), 214, 
246. This Article makes the case that consumers should be guaranteed free access to basic 
payment services, including the ability to save funds and withdraw cash. 
97 Fringe bank consumers cannot gain access traditional banking services through their own 
efforts by building credit using fringe services. Roger Swagler, John Burton & Joan Koonce 
Lewis, The Alternative Financial Sector: An Overview, 7 ADVANCING CONSUMER INT. 7, 9 
(1995) (explaining that borrowers who pay off obligations to fringe lenders do not see an 
improvement in their credit record because such transactions are not part of their formal credit 
history). 
98  Fringe banks structure products as to evade usury and consumer protection laws. Lynne 
Drysdale & Kathleen Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: 
The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury 
Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 590, 626–37 (2000).  
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regulatory scheme fails to require individual banks to measure and improve 
financial inclusion, it perpetuates the monopolistic fringe bank market.99  
Admittedly, the banking sector is a private, profit-making enterprise. 
As the recent financial crisis makes clear, there is substantial government 
support for the industry. The recent Wall Street Bailout, the powerful and 
effective banking lobby, and heretofore lax regulation of the AFS are direct 
and indirect displays of government support.100 Likewise, government has an 
obligation to level the playing field for economically vulnerable consumers. 
A robust regulatory system intervenes where necessary to change incentives 
in the markets while using aggressive enforcement tools to deter 
inappropriate behavior.101  
Maintenance of an efficacious financial system is a compelling 
governmental interest. Similarly, financial inclusion raises a single question: 
Should all citizens be given access to a reliable, safe payments system? The 
continued denial of an economic advantage tied to a compelling 
governmental interest sanctions the policy void that keeps the unbanked and 
underbanked out of the financial mainstream.  
The existing two-tier financial system does not provide fringe bank 
consumers with effective intermediation. The role of the Federal Reserve, as 
the architect of the payment system, requires examination. As discussed 
below in Part II, efficient, affordable, access to the payment system is the 
premise for arguing that access to the formal banking sector is a public good.   
 
II. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT OF BANKING 
 
Payment systems, which include the settlement and dispersion of 
funds, are the basis for monetary exchange in an economy. This financial 
infrastructure is crucial to facilitating access to financial services and the safe 
transfer of funds. Payment systems are also a critical component of directing 
relevant information in risk assessment. Currently, banks dominate the 
payment system, which is regulated by the Federal Reserve.  As the central 
bank, the Federal Reserve regulates both the monetary policy and the public 
functions of banking. Fringe bank consumers currently have access to the 
payment system though high costs servicers. The question becomes whether 
 
99 See discussion infra Part IV (arguing for a financial inclusion measurement as a part of a 
bank’s annual CRA exam). 
100 Most AFS providers are regulated at the state level, but the CFPB has limited authority to 
regulate some of the credit products regardless of the state’s regulatory authority. See 
generally Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 84 Fed. Reg. 
4252 (Feb. 14, 2019) (discussing, in part, CFPB regulation of payday lenders). 
101 Financial Services Authority, Production Intervention 27–28, 42 (Discussion Paper No. 
11/1, 2011) (U.K.). 
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the financial infrastructure and regulatory policy can and should be adjusted 
to accommodate the needs of and provide competitive access to banks’ 
transaction accounts for fringe bank consumers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
A. The Fiscal-Financial Linkage  
      
Traditionally, the financial system and overall economy depend on the 
unique functions that banks provide. Banks historically have provided three 
essential fiscal functions: (1) providing a reliable payment system by issuing 
transaction accounts; (2) maintaining financial stability throughout the economy 
as a back-up source of liquidity and (3) facilitating monetary policy.102 For this 
reason, banks are often labeled as “special.”103 In the financial sector, banks are 
a unique public-private hybrid: privately owned, but requiring permission for a 
charter; highly regulated with explicit conditions on their business activities.104  
Banks are an integral part of the fiscal and financial linkages in a 
market-capitalist economy. The underlying policy of the banking regulatory 
structure is public trust. The integrated functions and essential linkages 
between the fiscal and financial sectors cause concern for the central bank. 
Payment processing, financial stability, and monetary stability are economic 
risks that the Federal Reserve as the central bank oversees to keep the 
economy functioning well.   
 
 
 
 
 
102  Banks provide a safe and liable payments system, Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code along with federal statutes, and regulations issued by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System  govern the mechanism of the bank payments process. See,  e.g., 12 
U.S.C. §§ 4001–4010 (2018) (Expedited Funds Availability Act); id. §§ 5001–5018 (Check 
Clearing for the 21st Century Act); 12 C.F.R. § 229 (2020) (Availability of Funds and 
Collection of Checks). 
103 See, e.g., E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ARE BANKS 
SPECIAL?  (1983) https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/are-banks-special 
[https:// perma.cc/8Z8Y-64F6].   
104 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 203 (describing, for instance, the powers of the FDIC to install a 
Conservator to take control of a bank in certain scenarios). Bank dominance of the payment 
system can have a domino effect in case of bank failure. See Edward E. Furash, Banks are 
Obsolete—and Who Cares, 1 N.C. BANK. INST. 1, 8 (1997) (describing how a loss at one 
institution immediately affects the solvency of other institutions and the financial system). 
The inter-relatedness of bank and nonbank financial intermediaries increases the potential of 
systemic failure. See Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy 
Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 15, 72–73 (2015) 
(concluding that mitigating systemic risk requires individual financial institutions to go 
beyond contract immunities to protect against domino risk). 
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1. Payment Processing 
 
Banks operate the payment system that allows parties to establish 
transaction accounts.105 They provide consumers with a safe place for 
deposits, savings, payment processing as well as short- and long-term 
credit. Banks provide businesses with back-up credit lines. They also 
facilitate the economy by providing a way to process payments, distribute 
currency.106   
Depositors provide banks with the funds needed to operate and are 
protected by deposit insurance. Deposits are liabilities on the bank’s 
balance sheet that must be paid on demand. Banks use those deposits to 
make loans, which are assets with a long-term repayment. The bank’s 
capital covers the risk of loan loss and provides a cushion of liquid assets 
sufficient to preserve depositors’ confidence that any withdrawal demands 
will be met.107  
Deposit insurance provides protection that gives depositors 
confidence. It also provides monitoring of the institution’s solvency that 
individual depositors find too costly.108 The FDIC, created in response to 
bank runs during the 1932 Depression, guarantees a return of deposit 
liabilities in case of bank failure.109 That governmental protection is 
crucial in preserving financial stability by providing building consumer 
trust in banks. Banks further benefit in that traditional deposit insurance 
is subsidized by the federal government and governmental intervention, 
when needed, is an appropriate remedy.  
 
 
105 The increased interlinkages of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries that participate 
in payment systems increase the risk exposure throughout the financial system. As one 
commentator said, “I see little to be gained by insisting that banks always be the only type 
of entity that can provide such services.” Governor Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Bank of Eng., 
Remarks at the Seminar on Banking Soundness and Monetary Policy in a World of Global 
Capital Markets (Jan. 29, 1997), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1997/ 
19970129.htm [https://perma.cc/D6C5-ERBB].  
106 The Federal Reserve through its regulation of banks has the responsibility to maintain a 
sound banking system and a healthy economy by raising and lowering interest rates, which 
both manages consumer demand and monitors financial stability. Troy S. Brown, Legal 
Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd- Frank Act End Too Big to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & 
C.L. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (2012). 
107 See Gerard Gennotte & David Pyle, Capital Controls and Bank Risk, 5 J. BANK. & FIN. 
805, 805 (1991) (defining bank capital).  
108 Congress created the FDIC in 1932 as a part of the Glass-Stegall Act, which put in place 
extensive regulatory reforms. See generally Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 
48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 227 (2018)). 
109 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1821 (2018) (describing the creation of the FDIC and the 
function of FDIC insurance funds). 
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2. Financial Stability  
 
Historically, banks have been a separate, distinct, highly regulated 
industry within financial markets.110 In a modern economic system, banks 
are essential to economic growth because they provide credit and allocate 
resources.111 The deregulation of financial institutions allowed banks to 
expand into other financial markets, such as securities, funds management 
and insurance, and created other types of financial institutions, e.g., 
private equity groups.112 It is the financial stability of these integrated 
markets that provides the argument that access to the banking system is a 
public good. 
 
a. Integrated Financial Markets 
 
Financial crises are prevalent, though controlled, in modern market 
economies.113 Central banks are crucial to restoring financial stability and 
protecting the entire economic system from insolvency. The recent global 
financial crisis that began in the American subprime mortgage market 
required central banks to take individual and concerted actions to stabilize 
the global economy.114 The Federal Reserve’s response to the financial 
crisis resulted in the imposition of conventional policy actions––fiscal 
stimulus, closing of financial institutions, and capital injections into 
financial institutions––as well as unconventional policy actions, like 
providing direct support to important financial markets, lending to 
 
110 See Prasad Krishnamurthy, George Stigler on His Head: The Consequences of 
Restrictions on Competition in (Bank) Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 823, 850 (2018) 
(critiquing banking regulation as creating a false tradeoff between competition and risk and 
recommending that deposit insurance be structured in a way that eliminates risk-taking). 
  111  See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Banks and Economic Growth: Implications 
from Japanese History, 45 J.L. & ECON. 127, 130–31 (2002) (discussing the role of banks in 
the development of transitional and developed economies). 
  112 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 39, 44 (2011) (arguing that restrictive banking regulations such as the Volcker 
Rule ignore modern finance and new banking market participants).  
  113 See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don’t End or Audit The Fed: Central Bank 
Independence In An Age of Austerity, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43–44, 45 (2016) (describing 
the Federal Reserve’s role as an independent central bank in mitigating the frequency and 
severity of financial and economic crises). 
  114 See Kara M. Westercamp, A Crack in the Facade and the Whole Building Came Tumbling 
Down: A Critical Examination of the Central Banks’ Response to the Subprime Mortgage Loan 
Crisis and Global Financial Market Turmoil, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 233 
(2009) (discussing the interventionist role of central banks during a liquidity crisis). 
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nonbank institutions and investors, as well as purchasing securities not 
typically held in central bank portfolios.115   
The interlinkages of large banks in the economic system required 
government intervention during the recent financial crisis to prevent a 
massive collapse of the country’s economic system. Similarly, the solvency 
of financial markets became dependent on whether governmental 
intervention would shore up financial institutions.116  In this way, the fiscal 
or economic sector and the financial sector became indistinguishably 
interconnected. To the extent that fiscal and macroeconomic policies are 
crafted based on their effect on financial markets, economic policy is 
driving financial regulation and vice versa. Consequently, the regulation of 
the financial sector has become dependent on the health of the underlying 
national economy.117  
 
b. Maturity Transformation and the Repurchase Market 
 
Maturity transformation is at the heart of modern banking. The presence 
of maturity transformation—borrowing short to lend long—depends on 
investors having confidence in the banking system.118 Investment banks finance 
themselves with short-term debt or “repo”119 using large amounts of available 
cash to earn short-term interest. The collateral for these loans are securitized 
assets, such as mortgages, with long payment terms. Using long-term assets to 
 
115 GORDON H. SELLON, JR., FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY—AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE 2009 ECONOMIC POLICY SYMPOSIUM xxiii, xxiv (2009), 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2009/papers/introduction-2009.pdf 
[perma.cc/D2T3-5JM].   
116 See, e.g., Bear Stearns Company Profile, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/b/bear-stearns.asp [perma.cc/DE2D-CWFS] (last updated Oct. 4, 2019) (describing 
the collapse of Bear Stearns and subsequent support from the Federal Reserve). 
117 Y.V. Reddy, Financial Sector Regulation and Macroeconomic Policy 33 (Bank for Int’l 
Settlements Working Paper No. 62, 2012), https://www.cafral.org.in/sfControl/content/ Doc 
umentFile/1219201344602PM_BP62_%2009_Paper_by_Y_V_Reddy.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EX7M-VZZV]. 
118 As explained by one article, “maturity transformation” involves “the bank transform[ing] 
short-term, highly liquid liabilities like deposits into illiquid assets like bank loans to 
businesses, and these bank loans are critical to fueling economic growth. Without government 
regulation, however, the ‘maturity mismatch’ inherent in maturity transformation makes such 
a bank highly vulnerable to runs.” John C. Dugan, Addressing the Fundamental Banking 
Policy Problem of Runs: Effectively Subordinating Large Amounts of Long-Term Debt to 
Short-Term Debt to End "Too-Big-to-Fail,” 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 11, 13 (2018) 
118 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future 
of Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 237, 254–55 (1992) (discussing the history and 
function of repurchase agreements, or “repos”). 
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finance short-term debt creates a maturity mismatch.120 During the subprime 
crisis, there was a “repo run” when investors became uncertain about the value 
of the underlying collateral.121  
The risky process of maturity transformation depends to a large extent 
on investors having confidence in the payments system. Nonbank financial 
institutions, sometimes called shadow banks, pose a significant risk to the 
monetary system.122 “Lightly regulated,” these institutions are “deeply reliant 
on uninsured short-term debt that pose [sic] significant risk.”123 It is the 
systemic risk in the short-term lending market that can threaten the financial 
stability of a nation’s economy, making central bank guarantees necessary to 
shore up that market.124 Central banks help to contain contagion effects which 
occur when investors withdraw short-term wholesale funding on which many 
large financial firms and shadow banks rely.125 During the global financial 
 
120 Zachary J. Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral Hazard and the Problem 
of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REV. 221, 239–40 (2012). 
121 Fed Scholars: A Run on the Repurchase Market Caused the Financial Crisis and Will 
Probably Happen Again, REPOWATCH (May 23, 2011), https://repowatch.org/2011/05/23/fed-
scholars-a-run-on-the-repurchase-market-caused-the-financial-crisis-and-will-probably-hap 
pen-again [perma.cc/SJG9-Y6XN]. 
122 Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, defined “shadow banking” as “a 
diverse set of institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out traditional banking 
functions—but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to, the traditional system of 
regulated depository institutions.” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Some 
Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response, Russell Sage Foundation & Century 
Foundation Conference on “Rethinking Finance” (Apr. 13, 2012). 
123 THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: BANKING IN THE SHADOWS 5 (2016), 
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedB
usinessBankingInTheShadows.pdf [perma.cc/U55V-K2N9]. 
124 One commentator made the following observation: “After four years of efforts, regulators 
and the financial firms with the most at stake have failed to extinguish systemic risk in a 
crucial short-term lending market,” the repurchase market, “that greases the wheels of trading 
in U.S. Treasuries.” Liz McCormick, In Market That Ensnared Lehman, Risk of Debt Fire 
Sales Lingers, BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-
05-25/in-repo-market-that-ensnared-lehman-risk-of-fire-sale-lingers [perma.cc/6P6Z-N4EQ]. 
125 Problems in the wholesale market arguably still exist.  One government study found: “Data 
gaps persist in securities financing transactions, including repo and securities lending. The 
markets for these critical short-term funding instruments remain vulnerable to runs and asset fire 
sales. Yet comprehensive data on so-called bilateral repo and securities lending transactions are 
scant.” Richard Berner, Dir., Office of Fin. Research, Remarks by Office of Financial Research 
Director Richard Berner at the Third Annual Workshop on Financial Interconnectedness (Apr. 
12, 2016);  see also PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS & BNY MELLON, THE FUTURE OF 
WHOLESALE FUNDING MARKETS 13 (2015), https://www.bnymellon.com/_global-
assets/pdf/our-thinking/the-future-of-wholesale-funding-markets.pdf [perma.cc/6FKR-LMQC] 
(describing the repo market as the “circulatory system” and stressing its reliance on the “smooth 
transfer of collateral.”). 
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crisis, central banks protected investment banks from the threat of contagion 
or a run on bank assets.126   
Regulatory policies are likewise designed to ensure against 
financial instability.127 Underlying the “Too Big to Fail Doctrine” is the 
need for stability in the banking system and in the nation’s monetary 
economy. Disruptions to the payment system destroy the confidence that 
the markets need to operate. Infusing the capital needed to stabilize the 
economy is among the primary reasons that central banks exist.  The chief 
concern is that financial strain creates adverse consequences for the real 
economy. Thus, crises in financial systems have demonstrated the close 
linkage between financial stability and the health of the economy.128  
The global financial crisis highlighted the need for financial 
regulations aimed at maintaining financial stability.129 The need for 
regulatory change was systemic risk in capital markets. 
Changes are mandated both inside and outside of the banking 
system in order to enhance financial stability and strengthen the market.130 
Changes to a regulatory structure occur because regulators incentivize 
certain discretionary behavior or mandate compliance.  In this way, 
regulatory change is both incentive-based and information-based. The 
onus is on institutions to identify accurately and manage the inherent 
operational risks. For example, current regulations require certain 
 
126 See generally Filippo Occhino, Central Bank Lending in a Liquidity Crisis, 2 ECON. 
COMM. 1 (2016), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1a3c/ae877f9beab47b82ec03a10fe30391 
dedf08.pdf?_ga=2.187037288.1176492533.1578258461-32191665.1578258461 [https:// 
perma.cc/XCQ2-CN3N] (“[T]o prevent the liquidity crisis from developing into a much 
more costly economic and financial crisis, the central bank needs to provide liquidity to the 
banks that would be solvent under normal economic conditions . . . .”). 
127 See Howard Davis, Banking and the State: Changing the Social Contract, Remarks at 
Barclay’s Bank 6 (2008), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21466 [perma.cc/YH5C-T77C] (arguing 
that solution to the credit crisis is integrated regulation).  
128 One economist makes a distinction between “monetary stability” and “financial stability.” 
The former refers to the stability of the general price level, while the latter refers “to the 
stability of the key institutions and markets that go to make up the financial system.” Andrew 
Crockett, Why Is Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy?, 82 ECON. REV. 5, 6 (1997). 
  129 See generally, e.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE 
RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189 
_dec2010.pdf [perma.cc/2JMX-M75S] (presenting the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’s reforms on the issues of maintaining bank liquidity and resiliency). 
130 Jerome H. Powell, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., The Federal 
Reserve’s Framework for Monitoring Financial Stability: Remarks at the Economic Club of 
New York (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.bis.org/review/r181129a.pdf [perma.cc/5L6B-73H2]. 
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financial institutions to create a resolution plan that becomes operational 
if they fail.131  
Central banking is premised on maintaining financial stability. As 
evidenced in the subprime crisis, extreme and adverse economic conditions 
warrant the Federal Reserve’s setting policies and adjusting interest rates to 
protect the banking system's capacity to meet the credit needs of households 
and businesses. Maintaining the integrated relationship between private 
sector banking and the federal government leads to a financially stable 
banking and well-functioning financial system.   
Undoubtedly, the Federal Reserve’s role in maintaining economic 
stability is a critical one. The interrelatedness of financial markets affects 
financial stability and raises concerns about aspects of financial stability and 
economic risks which were unknown before the subprime crisis. The linkage 
between systemic stability and the solvency of individual institutions affects 
price and monetary stability to avoid a spillover into the entire economy. 
 
3. Monetary Stability  
 
Monetary stability, or the strength of pricing levels, overlaps with and is 
distinguishable from financial stability. Monetary stability policy determines 
how to measure inflation, sets inflation rates, and determines the permanency of 
prices by measuring inflation rate or price level.132 On the other hand, financial 
stability refers to the confidence that the public must have in both financial 
institutions and the markets.133 One of several significant linkages between the 
 
131 The regulatory framework now requires the largest banks to have higher capital and 
liquidity levels and to conduct stress-tests and create living wills. Dodd-Frank Act §165, 12 
U.S.C.§ 5365 (2018).  
132 As Loretta Mester explains,  
Monetary policy mainly works through its ability to affect current and 
expected future interest rates; however, in certain circumstances, it also 
has the ability to affect risk-taking by investors and financial institutions, 
and thereby is linked to financial stability. I believe that, in general, the 
goals of monetary policy and financial stability are complementary. For 
example, price stability helps businesses, households, and financial 
institutions make better decisions, thereby fostering the stability of the 
financial system. And a stable financial system allows for more effective 
transmission of monetary policy throughout the economy. 
Loretta J. Mester, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of Clev., Five Points About 
Monetary Policy and Financial Stability, Sveriges Riksbank Conference on Rethinking the 
Central Bank’s Mandate 2 (June 4, 2016), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/ 
speeches/sp-20160604-five-points.aspx [https://perma.cc/SYB8-XKX4] (footnote omitted). 
133 George G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crisis: A Taxonomy and Review 52 (Loyola 
Univ. of Chi. Working Paper, No. 1999-12, 1999), https://ideas.repec.org/p/dnb/staffs/ 
48.html [https://perma.cc/JC5A-5VK6]. 
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two is that institutions remain solvent and operate without interference from 
regulators, and those markets operate without short-term price fluctuations.   
The financial system is particularly fragile to market failure, justifying 
public policy intervention because of the widespread economic harm that can 
result. Excessive volatility in prices in financial markets has the potential to 
create instability at financial institutions. Yet, the instability in asset prices at 
financial institutions that causes investment losses does not warrant market 
intervention without evidence of market failure.  
Banks need sound macroeconomic policies.  The type of 
macroeconomic policies that sustain low inflation, while also encouraging 
economic growth, facilitate the efficient delivery of financial services and the 
safety and soundness of financial institutions.134 The Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC)  gives the Federal Reserve complete policy making control 
over the money supply.135  Through open market operations, the Federal Reserve 
attempts to sustain economic growth and stabilize the money supply.136  
The banking system  remains the principal way in which central banks, in 
general, and the Federal Reserve, specifically, implement monetary policy.137 
Financial and economic stability combine efficiency and competition. The Federal 
Reserve’s role as a central bank  is to create the needed elasticity directly and 
indirectly by setting the market prices and structure.138 Flexibility in market 
pricing, as dictated by supply and demand conditions affect the solvency of 
institutions, their profitability and potentially their failure. The central bank’s role  
 
134 For instance, “one cannot help but notice that the most severe problems in our banking 
and thrift industries during the 1980s stemmed from serious macroeconomic imbalances––
including the accelerating inflation of the late 1970s and the costly but necessary steps to 
reverse that trend in the 1980s.” Governor Edward W. Kelley, Jr., supra note 105. 
135 See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Conducting Monetary 
Policy, in THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 35–41 (10th ed. 2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/327P-4KHJ].  
136 Congress created the Federal Reserve System to reduce the risk of failures in the banking 
industry Over time, the Federal Reserve’s regulatory power extended to regulating the money 
supply.  By buying and selling of government securities on the “open market,” it increases 
and decreases the supply of money that is available for lending. Id. 
137 For example, the Federal Reserve regulates banks and the money supply through  reserve 
requirements, which control banks’ market participation. Specifically, the Federal Reserve, 
and other central banks, control short-term interest rates by manipulating the required 
reserves to satisfy banks’ demand. Banks can demand reserves only when they meet reserve 
requirements and access requires meeting funds management rules See 12 U.S.C. 461(b)(2) 
(2018) (requiring depository institutions to maintain specific levels of reserves). 
138 For more on the role of central banks, see generally Mester, supra note 132, at 13–14 
(making the point that “structural resiliency tools” can help central banks ensure stability). 
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is to permit market flexibility in pricing, while mediating price instability so that it 
does not damage consumer confidence and economic activity.139  
Central banking, arguably, creates a social contract between the banking 
system, regulators, and the government. As discussed below, the payments system 
is a crucial part of financial infrastructure used to facilitate financial stability and 
to mitigate financial crises by reducing settlement risks. The inter-linkages with 
financial markets and the Federal Reserve’s role in monitoring price stability is an 
acknowledged relationship between private sector banking and the federal 
government. That critical involvement also establishes the public nature of banks 
and banking and underlies the argument that access to banking is a public good.140   
 
B. Financial Intermediation as a Public Function   
   
1. Financial Intermediation 
 
The financial and economic viability of consumers depends on navigating 
the increasingly complex banking environment.141 Banks, historically, are the 
leaders in financial intermediation, using deposit accounts to fund consumer and 
commercial loans through maturity transformation. Understanding how privately 
owned banks use public resources in financial intermediation to make profits 
raises fundamental issues about who should have access to banks. 
Central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, license banks to create 
money.142 They also are responsible for payments system infrastructure used for 
check clearing, and holding banks’ reserve accounts.143 When deposit-withdrawal 
 
139 For more on the role of central banks, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., supra note 135, at 23–32 (describing how the federal reserve conducts monetary 
policy to stabilize the economy and level of prices).  
140 See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary? What 
Bank Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation—and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
453, 478 (2016) (describing the specialness of private banks as public franchises dispensing 
public credit); see also Piotr Masiukiewicz, Doctrine of Public Good in Banking Versus State 
Intervention 2–3 (Institute of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 38.2014, 2014), http:// 
www.badania-gospodarcze.pl/images/Working_Papers/2014_No_38.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WCU9-DYXJ] (arguing that the degree of state regulation of banking provides evidence that 
it is treated as a public good). 
141 Lawrence B. Lindsay, The CRA as a Means to Provide Public Goods, in REVISING THE CRA: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 160, 165 (Prabal 
Chakrabarti et al. eds., 2009), https://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/cra_ 
means_provide_public_goods.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGQ4-J58P].  
142 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 135, at 41–42 (outlining the 
tools central banks use to achieve the targeted federal funds rate). 
143 See Jaromir Benes & Michael Kumhof, The Chicago Plan Revisited (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 12/202, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12 202.pdf 
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demands exceed the amount in the central bank reserve account, the bank can 
make an overnight interbank loan from the central bank or other banks to meet the 
reserve requirement.144 The back-up liquidity from the central bank allows banks 
to both allocate credit through loans and facilitate payments through the payments 
system.145 The same functions that arguably make banks “special,” back-up 
liquidity and the payments system, are key to how they dispense credit.  
Banks are the intermediaries of borrowers and savers. They provide 
payment services, guarantee deposits, and create credit, using other people’s 
money. These functions, also essential to a viable economy, demonstrate the 
importance of banking to the economy. While consumers appear to voluntarily 
choose fringe banks and their products and services, lack of access to the formal 
banking economy creates challenges and generates additional concerns. 
Specifically, failure to participate in the formal banking economy means forsaking 
the primary way to enter the financial mainstream. Using the formal banking 
economy allows consumers to build wealth, acquire assets, and establish credit. If 
access to the formal banking economy is not widened, LMI consumers are not 
given the benefit of these public policy choices designed for the entire society’s 
benefit.146  
 
a. The Theory of Public Goods 
 
A public good is one that is needed for the public welfare, but is not 
provided by the private marketplace because it is not profitable.147 In economic 
 
[https://perma.cc/728M-N5BG] (discussing how the Chicago Plan required 100% backing of 
deposits by government-issued money to eliminate bank runs); Ulrich Bindseil, The Operational 
Target of Monetary Policy and the Rise and Fall of Reserve Position Doctrine (European Cent. 
Bank, Working Paper No. 372, 2004), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp 
372.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MPD-J52Y]; Piti Disyatat, Monetary Policy Implementation: 
Misconceptions and Their Consequences 2–4 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 
269, 2008), https://www.bis.org/publ/work269.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN7C-RQ7L]. 
144 Banks facing a liquidity crisis that are members of the Federal Reserve may borrow from 
the Fed’s Discount window. See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. 248(i)-(j) (2018). Interbank 
lending among insured depository institutions is regulated under 12 U.S.C. §371b-2, and 
includes “credit and liquidity risks, including operational risks, related to intraday and inter-
day transactions.” 12 C.F.R. §206.2(d). 
145 See IRVING FISHER, 100% MONEY AND THE PUBLIC DEBT 15–17 (2009) (ebook) (discussing 
the instability of demand deposits as a source of loans).  
146 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2018) (describing how bank investments may be accepted as 
public funds); see also Michael P. Malloy, Principles of Bank Regulation 496 (3rd ed. 2011)  
(discussing whether the Community Reinvestment Act was effective in increasing the 
availability of banking services to low-income communities). 
147 See Lindsay, supra note 141, at 160 (discussing the concept of a public good in the 
context of the CRA). 
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terms, a “good” must be something of value which is productive.148 In order for a 
good to be characterized as a public good, it must have two specific characteristics: 
(1) non-rivalrous and (2) non-excludable.149 To be a non-rivalrous good, anyone 
should be able to consume the good without a cost to others. To be a non-
excludable good, no one can be excluded from consuming it. The “publicness” of 
the good means that there can be simultaneous availability allowing more than one 
individual access to the good.150  
While government creates most public goods, such as first responders and 
public schools, the government can sanction private parties to create goods for 
public consumption.151 When public goods are created by a private entity, the 
inherent conflict is the need for an unlimited supply. The underlying 
competitiveness of the private market is at odds with the unlimited availability that 
is the very nature of public goods.152  
Economists disagree on whether public goods are more efficiently 
produced in the public sector. One theory posits that government produced public 
goods are the most efficient.153 It is premised on the idea that market failure has 
resulted in non-production and government expenditures are needed to produce 
the good.154 The other theory argues that private production of public goods may 
be more efficient. The premise is that market preferences may be undervalued, yet 
the goods still needed.155 The distinction is made to separate the justification for 
why a good is needed and the public expenditure of funds from whether a public 
or private party produces the good.156 Indeed, maximizing the public welfare 
should be sufficient justification for the support and legitimacy of public goods. 
 
148 Piotr Masiukiewicz, Doctrine of Public Good in Banking Versus State Intervention 3 (Inst. 
of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 38, 2014), http://www.badania-gospodarcze.pl/images/ 
Working_Papers/2014_No_38.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SPS-F69S]. 
149 J. M BUCHMAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 49 (1968). 
150 Joseph P. Kalt, Public Goods and The Theory of Government, 1 CATO J. 565, 567 (1981). 
151 Randall G. Holcombe, A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods, 10 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 
1, 2–4 (1997). 
152 See generally Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).   
153 Holcombe, supra note 151, at 4.  
154 See generally id. 
155 James M. Buchanan, Public Finance and Public Choice, 28 NAT’L TAX J. 383, 386  
(1975); see also Holcombe, supra note 151, at 12 (giving examples of private production of 
goods which are nonexcludable, like public goods). 
156 A different economic perspective completely negates the public goods theory and instead 
argues that the contractarian model of government is preferable.  By contrasting Rawls’ 
presumed social contract created by consensus with Nozick’s minimalist state intervention 
and Buchanan’s “constitutional contract,” political economist Scott Gordan posits that there 
are not clear entitlements to the public benefits of society, but instead they evolve as needs 
develop.  See Scott Gordon, The New Contractarians, 84 J. POL. ECON. 573–90 (1976) 
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b. Banking as a Public Good 
 
The idea of public goods in the financial sector is not a novel one. 
Economists have justified classifying banking as a public good based on 
public trust,157 the services banks provide,158 a coherent financial regulation 
and supervision framework,159 protection of the banking system and stability 
during a financial crisis,160 the “Too Big to Fail Doctrine”,161 and the social 
contract between citizens and the government.162 What is a more novel, but 
 
(reviewing several contractarian models of government); see generally JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (articulating a theory of justice as fairness, where fairness is 
defined by the principles that self-interested individuals would agree to if they were ignorant 
of their own political identities). Under this approach, the government contracts or agrees to 
provide goods that are needed for the public’s benefit. The exchange is mutually beneficial—
governmental institutions protect citizens by providing needed goods and citizens fund the 
government and elect its leaders. The government involvement lends legitimacy to institutions 
by creating processes and rules that are fair and collectively beneficial. The disincentive to 
encourage private sector development is that it would limit government profits. See also 
Holcombe, supra note 151, at 12–15 (describing a positive model of government, where the 
government produces goods for its citizens who in turn provide wealth for the government). 
157  E. Gerald Corrigan, President of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks before the 7th 
International Conference of Banking Supervisors in Cannes. France (Oct. 8, 1992), in E. Gerald 
Corrigan, Challenges Facing the International Community of Bank Supervisors, FED. RES. 
BANK N.Y. Q. REV., Autumn 1992, at 1, 6, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/ 
media/research/quarterly_review/1992v17/v17n3article1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U9B-Y2TR]. 
158 J.K. SOLARZ, FINANCIAL SYSTEM RISK MANAGEMENT 159 (2008). 
159 Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, The Evolution of Financial Supervision: The 
Continuing Search For The Holy Grail, in 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons & 
Challenges 263, 272 (Niels C. Thygesen et al., eds., 2013), http://EconPapers.repec.org/ 
RePEc:erf:erffft:1 [https://perma.cc/9UYE-TVW8].  
160 See Masiukiewicz, supra note 140, at 2 (“State intervention on a great scale during the 
subprime crisis indicates that the governments and international institutions treat banking as 
a special good.”); Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan on H.R. 10, the Financial Services Act 
of 1998, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, THE FED. RES. 
BOARD (June 17, 1998), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/ 
19980617.htm [https://perma.cc/ZGE2-BDMX] (“[D]evelopments in our financial system--
especially, but not solely in our banking system--can have profound effects on the stability of 
our whole economy”); KAREL LANNOO, COMPARING E.U. AND U.S. RESPONSES TO THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 6 (2010) (discussing the management of OTC derivatives by EU and 
American central banks, and observing that, “Both regulators aim at ensuring financial 
stability for the largest global financial market”). 
161 G. G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crisis: A Taxonomy and Review, 9 FIN. MARKETS, 
INST. & INSTRUMENTS 69, 110 (2000). 
162 See HOWARD DAVIES, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. ONLINE, BANKING AND THE STATE: 
CHANGING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 6 (2008), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21466/1/Banking 
%26theState.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YL3-4R7P] (arguing that central banks’ involvement in 
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less appealing, economic policy argument, is that banks have an economic 
responsibility to the public. That responsibility is two-fold: (1) protecting 
depositors and investors and (2) preserving systemic stability. Prudential 
regulation is justified given the key role the financial system plays in the 
economy.163 The crux of the economic responsibility argument is based on 
the indisputable role that modern banking plays in maintaining financial 
stability and the specific role that central banks play in systemic stability.  
Banking is a public–private partnership and central banks have a 
myriad of regulatory and operational functions. Central banks are the 
wholesalers of banking services with commercial banks providing retail 
services. Central banks create safety nets for financial institutions using 
capital to maintain the solvency of individual banks, a banking group, or as 
during the crisis, other entities in the financial system. Specifically, in the 
United States, deposit insurance and access to the discount window are 
benefits that banks receive from the federal government without which they 
would be unable to operate.  
First, the “public good” role of the financial system, as the pivot of 
the economy, justified that the prudential regulation framework be 
complemented by an intrusive supervisory framework. Deposit insurance 
provides banks with a significant advantage. Banks are able to attract 
customers because of the imprimatur of deposit insurance. The complex 
supervisory system monitors institutions’ risk-taking and lack of 
transparency to the depositors’ advantage. Customers do not have to 
determine the soundness of the institution nor monitor its performance for 
safety. The governance and risk management of individual financial 
institutions, both of which impact creditworthiness, is monitored by 
regulators.164 The system of regulation and supervision reduces customers’ 
costs of borrowing because banks have set capital requirements and 
limitations on lending, both of which are returned to the customer.  
Central banks serve as regulators of monetary policy. They have 
macro-economic management responsibilities. As Lenders of Last Resort 
(LLR), central banks prevent panic by providing credit to shore up 
institutions facing a liquidity crisis.165 These economic tools used to shore up 
banks all come from the public fisc or money supply. They are responsible 
for monetary policy and the workings of the financial system as a whole. 
 
the global liquidity crisis changed the expectations of financial institutions and the banks 
given the poor financial performance of many financial institutions). 
163 See discussion supra Part II.  
164 Robert J. Dijkstra, Accountability of Financial Supervisory Agencies: An Incentive 
Approach, 11 J. BANKING REG. 115, 115–28 (2010). 
165 Murray N. Rothbard, The Origins of the Federal Reserve, 2 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 3, 3, 39 
(1999). 
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Public involvement through financial assistance, restructuring bonds, tax 
relief and nationalization of financial institutions are all among the ways that 
central banks broadly protect against systemic failure.166 
Central banks have an operational function regarding the payment 
system. The central bank’s payments infrastructure facilitates payment 
between the central bank, privately owned banks, and banks’ borrowers. 
Banks’ settlement accounts with central banks can receive funds from the 
central bank in case withdrawals exceed actual deposits. Privately drawn 
checks clear through the payment system of one of the regional Federal 
Reserve Banks.167 Banks make loans based on a fraction of the deposits they 
hold. Banks are required to maintain a fraction of their deposit liabilities in a 
reserve account. The lending bank must have sufficient liquid funds in its 
account to cover withdrawals as well the reserve requirement.168 If the bank’s 
account will be insufficient to maintain the reserves after the overnight 
withdrawals,  the bank must either borrow from other banks or from the 
central bank. Inter-bank lending boosts confidence in the banking system by 
ensuring that the necessary funds are available. Customers are reassured that 
their deposits are safe, thereby reducing the risk of a bank run. Moreover,   
this fiscal undergirding allows banks to profit from and make loans.169  
While the proposals for financial inclusion can occur within the 
Federal Reserve’s traditional mandates of stability and integrity of the 
financial system, the next Section examines how the regulatory system thus 
far has ineffectively addressed financial inclusion.  
 
2. The Existing Regulatory Response  
 
In the U.S., several changes to the banking regulatory structure are 
targeted to provide access to those who face illegal discrimination. The 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), community development credit 
unions (CDCUs), and community development financial institutions 
(CDFIs) can be characterized as monitoring and providing access to credit 
for those who have faced historical discrimination in credit markets. 
Similarly, the recent postal banking proposal is specifically characterized 
 
166 See generally Michael Diekmann. The Swing to the State Must Not Go Too Far, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/30c40f2c-cf62-11dd-abf9-000077b0 
7658 [https://perma.cc/P2NH-B7BN] (discussing banks’ role in the economy and arguing 
that the debate is not if central banks should intervene, but how they will intervene). 
167 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 135, at 119 (explaining how 
the Federal Reserve collects checks deposited by banks and returns unpaid checks to the bank). 
168 See id. at 41–42 (describing the percentage of deposits that commercial banks must hold 
as reserves). 
169 Hockett & Omarova, supra note 140, at 480. 
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as promoting financial inclusion.170 As discussed below, the limited focus 
of these programs does not remedy the concerns noted above.  
 
a. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)  
 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), enacted in 1977, is the federal 
statute that mandates that a bank serve its entire geographical community. The 
statute has a limited purpose of increasing real estate lending.171   It requires 
federal banking regulators to encourage financial institutions to help meet the 
credit needs of the communities in which they do business, including LMI 
neighborhoods.172 Designed to prevent and detect discrimination, the CRA 
prohibits two well-established practices by financial institutions: disinvestment 
and redlining.  
Disinvestment occurs when depository institutions take deposits from a 
community but fail to extend credit to credit-worthy members of that 
community.173  Redlining is geographic discrimination. The historical practice 
was for lenders to actually or figuratively draw a red line on a map around the 
areas of their city, considered “poor credit risk” neighborhoods, which often 
were black, lower-income, or ethnic.174 Lending standards for these identified 
 
170 See Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Postal Serv., Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for 
the Underserved i (White Paper No. RARC-WP-14-007, Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.us 
psoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2015/rarc-wp-14-007_0.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/N89A-Y4SR] (outlining a proposal for using postal branches to provide “non-bank 
financial services to those whose needs are not being met by the traditional financial sector”).  
171 Under the service test, financial institutions provide and fund financial literacy 
program.12 C.F.R. § 7.1021. 
172 Nellie R. Santiago, et al., Turning David and Goliath into the Odd Couple: How the New 
Community Reinvestment Act Promotes Community Development Financial Institutions, 6 
J.L. & POL’Y 571, 573 (1998). The FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the OCC each supervise 
banks that have CRA obligations. The FDIC supervises FDIC-insured, state-chartered banks 
and savings banks   that are not members of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve 
supervises state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. The OCC 
supervises national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988).  
173 Specifically, the Act requires depository institutions to “demonstrate that their deposit 
facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to 
do business.” 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (2018). For more on divestment, see Gary M. Swidler, 
Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 393 (1994) Gary 
Swidler, Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 393 (1994) 
(defining disinvestment as “when depository institutions take in capital, usually in the form 
of deposits, from one community and then use the funds to make loans outside that 
community”). 
174 The Congressional sponsor of the CRA described the practice as:  
“[Taking] deposits from a community and instead of reinvesting them in 
that community, they will invest them elsewhere, and they will actually or 
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areas were different, with credit often non-existent because of those strict 
policies.175  
 To combat these practices, the CRA requires the evaluating regulatory 
agency “to assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of the entire 
community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent 
with the safe and sound operation of such institution.”176 The CRA rating, which 
is an annual assessment done by the banking regulators, is taken into account 
when there is a bank merger or acquisition. At that time, regulators evaluate how 
the institution has met the “credit needs” of the community.177 
The CRA has its critics. Initial criticisms focused on the vague language178 
and the indirect enforcement.179 Institutions found it difficult to interpret their 
responsibilities on “meet[ing] the credit needs of local communities.”180 The 
statute was amended to include three tests, (1) lending, (2) investment, and (3) 
service, making obligations less vague.181  Communities found the statutes’ 
implementation ineffective.182 The CRA is also controversial because banks 
 
figuratively draw a red line on a map around the areas of their city, 
sometimes in the inner city, sometimes in the older neighborhoods, 
sometimes ethnic and sometimes black . . . .”  
123 Cong. Rec. 17,630 (daily ed. June 6, 1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
175 Lenders restricted lending in these areas by having exorbitant interest rates and loan fees. 
See Jonathan P. Tomes, The “Community” in the Community Reinvestment Act: A Term in 
Search of a Definition, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 225, 227–28 (1991) (discussing the 
practice of justifying high interest rates that in effect restricted lending in certain 
neighborhoods). 
176 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (2018). 
177  12 U.S.C § 2901 (2018). 
178 See Allen Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but 
Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 203, 297 (1993) 
(critiquing the CRA as vague).  
179 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An 
Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 202–93 (1993) (critiquing the CRA ‘s burdensome 
compliance costs). 
180 A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
1431, 1437–39 (1995) (describing the Act's language as vague, particularly “credit need,” 
which could refer to a borrower’s ability to pay a risk-adjusted interest rate, or a borrower’s 
ability to only afford a rate that did not reflect its risk of default); see also Jonathan A. 
Neuberger & Ronald H. Schmidt, A Market-Based Approach to CRA, ECON. LETTER, 1994, 
no. 21, at 1, 1 (arguing that "[t]he language of the CRA statute was intentionally vague, 
balancing a social policy goal of encouraging banks to lend in lower income areas with 
regulators' concerns about bank safety and soundness”). 
181 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.22, 228.23, 228.24 (2019).  
182 See Griffith L. Garwood & Dolores S. Smith, The Community Reinvestment Act: 
Evolution and Current Issue, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 251, 251 (1993) (explaining that “many 
community and consumer groups…believe that financial institutions are not doing enough 
to help meet the credit needs of residents and businesses in low- and moderate-income 
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argue that it can become an unfair bargaining tool, even promoting risky 
investments.183   
Despite these controversies, the CRA has been successful to the extent that 
it incentivized local financial institutions to reevaluate lending opportunities in 
underserved areas.184 As discussed below in Part III, the CRA might prove useful 
to measure banks’ effectiveness in financial inclusion efforts. 
 
b. Community Development Credit Unions (CDCUs) 
 
 CDFIs were established with the aim of promoting economic 
revitalization by providing low-income communities with access to essential 
financial services.185  In 1994, Congress passed the Riegle Community 
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act.186 One of the many essential 
 
areas”); see also Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act 
and its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV., 513, 565 (2005) (noting that the CRA was generally 
considered ineffective during the 1980s due to “inadequate regulatory attention”); 
Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 
79 VA. L. REV. 349, 349 (1993) (arguing that “the CRA may actually decrease the level of 
investment in low-income and moderate-income communities, while imposing enormous 
compliance burdens on banks”).  
183 See Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented 
Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1565 (1995) 
(arguing that the “asymmetry of information” on a borrower’s risk of default between banks 
and the borrower may discourage banks from lending to LMI communities). 
184 Some studies have shown increased lending to underserved communities since the CRA’s 
enactment, though it is difficult to distinguish how much of the increase was attributable to 
just the CRA or whether the CRA-induced lending has been overall profitable. One study 
attributed the statute’s design with the difficulty of assessing whether the incentivized lending 
that of was profitable. See generally, e.g., Darryl E. Getter, Cong. Research Serv., R43661, The 
Effectiveness of the Community Reinvestment Act 2, 9 (2020), https://crsreports. 
congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43661 [https://perma.cc/L83V-7P8A]; Sumit Agarwal et al., 
Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18609, (2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w18609.pdf [https://perma.cc/V942-479K]. While the CRA was not the cause of the 
subprime crash, critics argue that it contributed to the housing bubble and the general 
expansion of credit during the 1990s. See Lindsay, supra note 141, at 164.  
185 Beginning in the 1880s, when the first minority-owned banks focused on low-income 
areas, community organizations developed CDFIs to provide needed financial services. From 
the creation of credit unions in the 1930s and 1940s, community development corporations 
beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, and to the more recent emergence of non-profit loan funds 
in the 1980s, the predecessors to CDFIs sought to better the conditions in these economically 
underserved markets. See generally U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, What Are CDFIs? (n.d.), 
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/CDFI_infographic_v08A.pdf. [https://perma.cc/K9ZN 
-RZHW] (providing a brief history of CFDIs). 
186 Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-325, 66 Stat. 2160 (1994) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 470 (2018)).  
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functions of this legislation was the establishment of the Community 
Development Financial Institutions Fund.187 The Community Development 
Financial Institutions Fund procures funding through the United States 
Department of the Treasury in order to invest in and assist CDFIs by 
enhancing their liquidity.188  
CDFIs come in many forms, the most common being CDCUs, and 
Community Development Loan Funds.189 CDCUs are generally established 
in order to provide fairly priced loans, as well as savings and checking 
accounts for their low-income members.190 In addition, CDCUs serve the 
essential function of bridging the gap between low- and moderate-income 
borrowers and traditional commercial loans.191  
At first blush, CDCUs purport to serve as an effective means of 
integrating marginalized individuals in the United States into the formal 
banking system. This approach to financial inclusion, however, has not been 
universally accepted, and many CDCUs have struggled to maintain economic 
viability.192  Approximately 50 percent of start-up CDCUs failed in the 
1990s, which can be attributed to several factors including: “under-qualified 
management and boards; inadequate capital, liquidity, bookkeeping, and 
staffing; limited range of services; inadequate economies of scale; absence of 
collaboration with community partners; and inadequate use of existing 
 
187 Id. § 120. 
188 12 U.S.C. § 4701 (2018). 
189 Christopher Jordan Heisen, Comment, Community Development Lite: An Economic Analysis 
of the Community Development Financial Institutions Act, 39 HOW. L.J. 337, 348 (1995).  
190 A CDCU has a specific focus on the economic well-being of LMI members. . Robert W. 
Shields, Community Development Financial Institutions and the Community Development 
Financial Institutions Act of 1994: Good Ideas in Need of Some Attention, 17 ANN. REV. 
BANKING L. 637, 650 (1998).  
191 CDCUs in some areas may help those whose access to credit is limited by income, but 
not enough to qualify for government subsidies: 
In addition to serving areas where no other lending institutions exist, CDCUs 
serve a market niche that other types of lending institutions and programs do 
not. For example, CDCUs serve as a place where low- and moderate-income 
people can pool their savings and receive loans that they otherwise would not 
be able to receive. Many of the low-and moderate-income borrowers’ income 
is too high to qualify for government subsidized loan programs yet not high 
enough for them to qualify for traditional commercial loans. They are, 
however, able to obtain credit via CDCUs. 
Id.  
192 See Charles D. Tansey, Community Development Credit Unions: An Emerging Player in Low 
Income Communities, BROOKINGS (Sept. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ 
community-development-credit-unions-an-emerging-player-in-low-income-communities/ 
[https://perma.cc/5V XT-4J65] (highlighting the multitude of reasons for CDCUs’ widespread 
failure). 
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programs and financial institutions to support their efforts.”193 Chartering a 
CDCU, similar to a bank, requires meeting prerequisite conditions. The 
organizational plan for a CDCU must show that it will be economically 
viable.  Before obtaining a charter, the organization must show that the 
proposed combination of members, deposit, institutions and social investors 
will produce a sustainable flow of capital.194  
The failure of CDCUs to rectify the issue of financial exclusion can 
be attributed to their weak financial performance when compared to that of 
banks.195. Between the years of 2005 and 2010, the operating expense ratio 
of these credit unions was 36 percent higher than the industry, and the ratio 
of net operating expenses to average assets was 27 percent higher for CDFI 
credit unions.196  Furthermore, CDFI credit unions have experienced 
declining earnings and rising delinquency rates, which are higher than the 
credit union industry as a whole.197 
Finally, CDCUs are burdened with the requirement of maintaining 
self-sufficiency in order to remain operational.  As a result of this burden, and 
without the margin for error that some of their more conventional 
counterparts have, CDCUs often cannot engage in the very high-risk 
financing that they were established to facilitate.198 Currently, there exist 
approximately 237 CDCUs in the United States, in comparison with the 4518 
commercial banks in the United States.199 CDUs, alone, have not addressed 
the problem of financial exclusion, making the discussion below of postal 
banking, a well-considered alternative at one time200  
 
 
193 Id.  
194 See Lehn Benjamin et al., Community Development Financial Institutions: Current Issues 
and Future Prospects, 26 J. URB. AFF. 177, 189 (2004) (describing regulations to which 
CDCUs must adhere in order to offer federal depository insurance). 
195Historical Trends as of December 31, 2019, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
statistical/stats/2019dec/fdic.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2020). 
196 NAT’L. CREDIT UNION ADMIN., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 142 (2012), https://www.ncua.gov/ 
Legal/Documents/Reports/AR2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/FET8-F65S].  
197 Id. at 76.  
198 For example, regulators have allowed relatively few CDCUs to make small-business loans 
because of the higher risk involved in such lending. Neither banks nor credit unions can make 
equity investments in start-up businesses (although non-regulated bank affiliates may do so). Id.  
199 See Membership Directory, INCLUSIV, http://www.cdcu.coop/membership/membership-
directory/ [https://perma.cc/B6C2-28NF] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (listing 247 CDCUs in 
its national Membership Directory).); Statistics at a Glance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2019dec/fdic.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGG7NGYE] 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2020). 
200 See 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 1 (“The unbanked rate in 2017 declined to the 
lowest level since the survey began in 2009. Since the survey was last administered in 2015, 
the unbanked rate has fallen by 0.5 percentage points.”).  
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c. The Postal Banking Proposal 
 
Similarly, the recent proposal calling for postal banking in the United 
States recognizes the need to support financial inclusion as well as the 
absence of a strong competitive alternative.201 In 2014, the U.S. Postal 
Service Office of Inspector General released a white paper proposing that the 
Postal Service provide non-bank financial services to individuals who are 
underserved by the traditional financial sector.202 The white paper posits that 
individuals remain unbanked or underbanked for a myriad of reasons, many 
of which Post Offices are best situated to address.203 For example, the 
network of post offices, stations, and branches is spread out across the 
country, to include “banking deserts” and geographical areas where 
individuals have little or no access to banks or other financial institutions.204 
The proposal cites to Americans’ trust and familiarity with the postal brand 
and the importance of trust in the financial services sector, particularly when 
considering the experiences of unbanked and underbanked individuals in 
dealing with fringe banking systems or untrustworthy financial service 
providers.205 Further, the post office environment, policies, and procedures 
are less intimidating than that of banks, and many Americans, including the 
poor, are familiar with their location, the processes, and in some cases the 
Post Office employees.206   
 
201 See U.S. POSTAL SERV., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL 
SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED i (2014) [hereinafter PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL 
SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED] (contending that “[p]ostal organizations have an unmatched 
ability to reach consumers from diverse backgrounds); cf.  Eric Grover, Return to Sender: Here's 
What's Wrong With Postal Banking, AM. BANKER (May 17, 2018), https://www.americanbank 
er.com/opinion/return-to-sender-heres-whats-wrong-with-postal-banking [https://perma.cc/84 
DY-CR24] (arguing against the use of postal banking). See generally, Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s 
Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 174–75 (2014) (contesting that the 
postal banking proposal will result in the predicated increased revenues because small 
dollar loans are not profitable). 
202 As stated in the white paper,  
According to the FDIC, certain segments of the population are 
disproportionately underserved, including lower-income, black, and 
Hispanic households, as well as people under the age of 25. However, white 
households still account for half of the underserved. Geographically, the 
underserved live throughout the country. However, they are over-
represented in the South, where poverty is more prevalent, and in inner cities. 
PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED, supra note 201, at 3. 
203 Id. Consumers are unbanked for procedural reasons, e.g., violation of bank rules and/or 
requirements, and cultural reasons, e.g., don’t feel comfortable using banks.  
204 Baradaran, supra note 201, at 167–68.  
205 PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED, supra note 201, at 6. 
206 Baradaran, supra note 201, at 169. 
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The proposal of a postal banking system is not a revolutionary 
concept in the United States. In 1910, Congress established a Postal Savings 
System in order to establish a formal savings system for immigrants who 
were accustomed to saving at their local Post Offices in their home countries 
and to integrate the unbanked poor into the formal banking system.207 The 
nationwide program was designed to encourage savings by providing a secure 
place to make deposits.208 By 1947, the Postal Savings System had 
accumulated approximately $3.4 billion in savings deposits from 4 million 
customers.209 Eventually, by 1964, the Postal Savings System saw a decline 
in usage and deposits declined, dropping to $416 million.210 The system was 
eventually discontinued in 1967 due to the decline in its usage.211  
The success of the Postal Savings System and need for a solution 
to integrate unbanked and underbanked Americans has sparked a proposal 
for its resurgence in today’s financial services sector. Currently, the 
United States Postal Service provides customers with limited financial 
services such as money orders.212 The proposal would increase customers’ 
access to those services by broadening the scope of services provided and 
establishing a public bank, which would also take deposits and make small 
loans.213  An example of a payment service offered by the postal banking 
proposal is the Postal Card.214 The Postal Card  would function as  a 
prepaid card, allowing to  load onto the  funds onto  the card and  withdraw 
cash at ATMs, pay bills online, and transfer funds.215 Furthermore, the 
 
207 The Postal Savings System garnished support within the formal banking sector. 
“Although bankers first viewed the Postal Savings System as competition, they later were 
convinced that the Postal Savings System brought a considerable amount of money out of 
hiding from mattresses and cookie jars.” Postal Savings System, U.S. POSTAL SERV. (July 
2008), http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-history/postal-savings-system.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9KPE-YMJ8]. 
208 This program was created and geared to recent immigrants and the unbanked poor and at 
the end of the first year, there was a total of $20 million in deposits. Baradaran, supra note 
201, at 170. 
209 Id. 
210 Id.  
211 Id. 
212 Sending Money Orders, U.S. POSTAL SERV., https://www.usps.com/shop/money-
orders.htm [https://perma.cc/VA8K-VVRE] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
213 See PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED, supra note 201, at i–
ii, 9–17. 
214 Id. at 10. 
215According to the white paper, 
With the development of highly secure identity verification systems and 
partnerships with government at the local, state, and federal levels, the 
cards also could send or receive tax payments and refunds, as well as 
handle other government-to-citizen or citizen-to-government payments. 
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Postal Service can partner with traditional financial institutions to provide 
“an interest-bearing savings feature” on the Postal Card.216would allow the 
underserved to develop a savings system to adequately prepare for a crisis 
or save money for a large purchase.217 
Opponents of the postal banking proposal assert that simply 
utilizing post offices to provide financial services to unbanked and 
underbanked Americans is not the comprehensive program needed to 
effectively remedy financial exclusion.218 These opponents assert that 
postal banking would not provide the financial education and planning 
assistance that families in underrepresented communities need in order to 
maintain long term financial stability.219 
As discussed below, the adverse impact of the recent financial 
crisis on large segments of the population raises questions about the 
objectives of financial sector policy. Specifically, the issue becomes 
whether the purpose of financial sector public policy is to ensure fiscal 
stability as well as equity. 
 
III. FINANCIAL SECTOR PUBLIC POLICY AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION                       
     
Two failures—banking concentration and the low quality of the 
fringe banking industry (microfinance) institutions have created financial 
exclusion. Bringing fringe bank consumers into the banking mainstream 
requires that the financial impediments that banks face in offering those 
accounts be resolved. Banks need to reduce the agency and transaction 
costs involved in offering transaction accounts to maintain a competitive 
advantage. This Part proposes allowing agent or branchless banking to 
operate in commercial establishments as a way to increase access points 
to the formal financial system for fringe bank consumers. The 
recommendation would help prevent predatory practices in the provision 
of financial services and make supervision of the financial inclusion 
activities proportionate to the risks, rather than imposing onerous 
regulatory costs on the banking sector.  
 
 
Such a product would not only help reduce the government costs associated 
with cash and check payments, it also would help fulfill the goal of bringing 
the underserved into the mainstream financial fold. The funds on Postal 
Cards could be covered by the FDIC insurance of a partner bank.”  
PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED, supra note 201, at 10.  
216 Id. at 11. 
217 Id.   
218 See, e.g., Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 DUKE L.J. 233, 295 (2017). 
219 Id.  
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A. The Agent Banking Proposal 
 
Consumers who obtain financial services outside the mainstream 
banking system may not receive the same level of safety and security.220 Yet, 
creating confidence and trust among these consumers depends on their 
relationship with the institution. Offering services designed for fringe bank 
consumers requires acknowledging the expense, convenience, and cultural 
preferences of this market segment.221  
Agent banking is a cost-effective delivery model for financial 
institutions.222 By changing the costs and risks of delivering financial services, 
distribution channels outside the branch reach large numbers of unserved 
people. The traditional agency relationship assigns responsibility to the 
principal for the agent’s actions, making this a potentially costly endeavor. 
 
 
220 See Ludwig, supra note 10.  
221 See generally ELISABETH RHYNE, CTR. FOR FIN. INCLUSION, MONEY MANAGEMENT, 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION, AND BANKING THE UNBANKED 3–5 (2012), https://swiftinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Elisabeth-Rhyne-MoneyManagement-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6E2A-H4X2].  As one researcher noted, “From a policy perspective, if bank accounts are opened 
but not used, their value in terms of broad social or economic objectives is limited.” Id. at 4. 
222 Agent banking has resulted in revolutionary inclusion in the financial systems of Brazil, 
Columbia, Peru, Malaysia, and Kenya as a business model used to provide access to financial 
services in remote, unbanked areas of developing countries. See Paul M. Leonardi et al., Multiplex 
Appropriation in Complex Systems Implementation: The Case of Brazil’s Correspondent Banking 
System, 40 MGMT. INFO. SERV. Q. 461, 462 (2016) (discussing how Brazil’s new banking system 
has led to financial inclusion); see also Kurt von Mettenheim & Olivier Butzbach, Alternative 
Banking: Theory and Evidence from Europe, 32 BRAZ. J. POL. ECON. 580, 581 (2012) (discussing 
the success of agent banking in Germany, Spain, Sweden, and Austria). 
The proposed model, which is similar to having a satellite bank, is not currently authorized 
in the U.S. banking structure and requires new law and regulation. What U.S. banking 
regulation allows are interbank relationships, which permit banks to perform various 
functions for other banks. Moreover, correspondent banking is defined differently in the 
United States than in developing countries where the structure is used to promote financial 
inclusion. In the United States, a correspondent bank, unlike a branch bank, is independent and 
separate in terms of ownership, financing products, and image. One of the distinguishing 
features of bank correspondents is that the ordinary bank customer is aware that the banks are 
separate from one another. The OCC defines “correspondent services” as “hold[ing] deposits 
for other banks and perform[ing] correspondent services for those banks, such as check 
clearing.” Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Activities Permissible for National Banks 
and Federal Savings Associations 26 (2017), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-res 
ources/publications/banker-education/files/pub-activities-permissible-for-nat-banks-fed-sav 
ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTM3-F7GE]. Among the permissible common interbank functions 
are receiving deposits on behalf of another bank and disbursement of loan funds. See 12 C.F.R. 
§ 206 (2019) (describing limitations on interbank liabilities); see also United States v. Citizens 
& S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 114 (1975) (explaining that “in neither law nor banking custom 
has there developed a clear, fixed definition of the correspondent relationship”).  
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1. The Law and Economics of Agency 
    
Agency is a beneficial relationship between a principal and an agent 
that results in an efficient division of labor.223 The principal benefits from the 
effort of the agent; the agent provides the principal with her skill.224 It is 
common for the principal to engage an agent even if the task is one that the 
principal is capable of performing.   
One of the significant concerns in agency theory is the misalignment 
of the incentives that principals and agents have. Principals must always find 
ways to mitigate the characteristic disincentive that agents have to not 
perform in the principal’s best interests.225 To encourage the principal’s 
supervision of the agent, law holds the principal responsible for the agent’s 
misdeeds. Unquestionably, the principal has to weigh the expected benefits 
of the agency relationship against the costs.226 
The presumption in law is that the incentives of agents are aligned 
with their principals. Principals are held liable for agents’ inappropriate 
conduct or decisions.227 In economic terms, the relationship raises several 
“costs” that should be considered. 
 
223 See Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by 
Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 515, 536–45 (2007) (discussing the agency relationship in light of the preemption doctrine 
and how the federal preemption doctrine denied state banking regulators the opportunity to police 
the agents of depository institutions engaging in predatory lending practices). 
224 Agency is (1) a consensual relationship; (2) where one person is a representative of 
another; (3) the representative has the “power to affect the legal rights and duties of the other 
person”; and (4) the “person represented has a right to control the actions of the agent.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
225 Id. at cmt. c. Meinhard v. Salmon is the classic agency case discussing fiduciary duty. See 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (finding the defendant liable for a breach of 
contract in a joint venture agreement when the defendant failed to disclose related 
transactions to the plaintiff). 
226 Agency is not a costless relationship. The transaction costs a principal must assume are 
monitoring and bonding costs as well as residual loss.  See Alva Curtis, Delaware and the 
Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 916–17 (1990) 
(discussing Delaware’s ability to reduce agency costs in the corporate charters market). 
227 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 224, at § 7.02. The law of agency is well summarized by 
several notable authors. See generally Eric Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics (John 
M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, No. 92, 2000), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=204872 [https://perma.cc/V29Z-GLRY] (describing agency models 
and agency relationships); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s 
Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973) (examining a mathematical model of pareto efficient 
agency cost allocation). 
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Principals incur agency costs in order to spread the risk of loss in 
case of agents’ wrongs.228 Monitoring costs are the costs of observing and 
possibly controlling the behavior of the agent.229 Bonding costs are the 
costs the principal incurs to recoup losses in case the agent acts against 
the principal in a detrimental manner.230 Residual loss captures the lost 
welfare that the principal incurs because of the agent’s failure to be 
productive.231 It protects the principal when the principal cannot fully 
police the agent’s decreased productivity, despite monitoring and bonding 
costs.232  
Third parties who deal with agents create significant cause for 
concern in agency law. Aligning the motivations of principals and agents 
requires holding the principal responsible for harmful acts of the agent 
even when the agent acts outside the scope of her duties, as long as there 
is a causal relationship.233 This underlies the rationale that principals can 
use agents to engage in conduct that would be inappropriate or even 
unacceptable had the principal herself engaged in the acts.  
The inherent conflict of interest between the agent bank’s business 
and the parent bank’s raises issues germane for regulatory oversight. 
Moreover, the obstacles in the prudential regulation of banking services 
through branchless banking arrangements must be analyzed. 
 
2. Regulatory Oversight and Prudential Supervision of Agent Banking    
 
In places where branching is not cost-efficient due to low deposit 
enrollment, high transaction costs, and inadequate loan opportunities, agent 
or branchless banking allows banks to offer traditional products.234  Agent 
 
228 See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & 
POL’Y. REV. 265, 278–79 (1998) (discussing the costs that principals impose on agents 
through an example of risk and loss spreading through a lawyer-client relationship). 
229 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (describing agency 
costs as “(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures of 
the agent” . . . and “(3) the residual loss.”). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 See Peterson, supra note 223, at 540 (describing residual loss as often the dominant 
agency cost). 
233 See discussion infra note 277. 
234 This proposal requires explicit statutory authorization and would change the traditional 
separation of banking and commerce. See Stephen Halpert, The Separation of Banking and 
Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481, 484–90 (1988) (describing three categories of 
restrictions on bank conduct centered around nonbanking activity). Branchless banking, as 
it has evolved in the United States, refers to the delivery of financial services outside of bank 
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banking changes the costs and risks of delivering financial services through 
distribution channels outside the branch.235 The typical agent bank hires 
 
branches and without using bank personnel by relying heavily on technology to complete 
transactions. See Sandra B. McCray, Constitutional Issues in State Income Taxes: Financial 
Institutions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 895, 903 (1987) (discussing how the history of branch banking, 
as allowing banks to branch across states lines before the Graham-Leech-Bliley Act, eased the 
restrictions on interstate banking). In emerging countries, branchless banking involves relying 
upon an agent to assist with the transaction. See Shanthi Elizabeth Senthe, Transformative 
Technology in Microfinance: Delivering Hope Electronically?, 13  PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y. 
1, 17 (2012) (describing the role of microfinance institutions delivering products, such as 
mobile banking, in an increasingly technological world). Professor John Caskey recommends 
a different, but similar approach for reaching the unbanked. See JOHN P. CASKEY, BRINGING 
UNBANKED HOUSEHOLDS INTO THE BANKING SYSTEM 5 (2002), https://www.brookings.edu 
/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/caskey.pdf [https://perma.cc/89DW-5TUH]. He proposes 
having banks offer check-cashing services at highly competitive rates in specialized bank 
branches or “outlets.” Id. Caskey posits that this would create new sources of revenue, adding 
to the branches’ profitability. Id. Additional services would include wire transfers and 
remittances and in-person payment services for utility and other household bills. Id. The 
other unique feature of the outlets would be their placement, which should be in locations 
that are convenient for LMI households. Id. 
235 Correspondent banking, a type of agent banking, is a very popular and successful business 
model that provides access to financial services in remote, unbanked areas of developing 
countries. See Leonardi, supra note 222, at 461 (describing the rise of a new banking system 
aimed at overcoming financial exclusion through providing access to a country’s formal 
financial system). The proposed model, which is similar to having a satellite bank, is not 
currently authorized in the U.S. banking structure and requires new laws and regulation. 
What U.S. banking regulation allows are interbank relationships, which permit banks to 
perform various functions for other banks. Moreover, correspondent banking is defined 
differently in the United States than in developing countries where the structure is used to 
promote financial inclusion. In the United States, a correspondent bank, unlike a branch 
bank, is independent and separate in terms of ownership, financing products and image. One 
of the distinguishing features of bank correspondents is that the ordinary bank customer is 
aware that the banks are separate from one another.  
 Fintech, Financial services via technology, is a disrupter that is leading towards 
wholesale digital transformation of the banking industry. As noted earlier, the Federal 
Reserve’s efficacy as a link between payments and the transmission of money is critical. In 
August 2020, the Federal Reserve announced the FedNow Service, which will operationalize 
in 2023 or 2024. FedNow Service, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_about.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
HTF5-ZKY2] (last updated Aug. 6, 2020). The liquidity tool will support an instant payment 
service providing real-time payment to consumers. To the extent that it allows LMI 
consumers to avoid high-interest loans and expensive check cashing services, it will both 
provide access to and decrease the costs of participating the formal banking economy. Jeanna 
Smialek, The Fed Moves Closer to a New Way to Get People Their Money Faster, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/06/business/the-fed-moves-closer-to-
a-new-way-to-get-people-their-money-faster.html [https://perma.cc/V2MZ-7WP3]. 
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nonfinancial commercial establishments as agents.236 These entities provide 
financial services on the bank’s behalf, increasing the geographical 
dispersion of banking services.237 Agent banking systems are more 
sustainable than branch banking because mobile technology and the existing 
network of local agent bank retailers control establishment and operation 
costs.238  
Agent banking systems widen the parent bank’s distribution 
channel for products and services through the contractual relationship 
between the parent bank and the agent bank. 239  The contract determines 
the scope of services, i.e., accepting deposits and making loans, fees paid 
and risk-sharing. Preferably, agent banking combines the services of banks 
 
236 This proposal raises the common conflict of the powers and duties of banks versus 
nonbanks. A bank is commonly defined as an institution that takes deposits and makes 
commercial loans. See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) 
(1982) (defining bank holding companies and stipulating rules for expansion and 
divestment). Nonbanks are restricted to offer only one of these services. See generally Carl 
Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks—An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 BUS. LAW. 99, 100 (1985) 
(discussing deregulating the activities of bank holding companies). Although the agent bank 
will accept deposits, it will be a subsidiary of a bank and regulated by the Federal Reserve 
under the Bank Holding Company Act.  
237 See id. (discussing the implications of forming a “nonbank bank” in this way). 
238 See Dzikamai Shoko Bizah, Linda Gumbo & Rabson Magweva, Agent Banking as a 
Driver of Financial Inclusion in Zimbabwe: A Review, 5 INT’L J. EDUC. & RES. 89, 92–94 
(2017) (concluding that agent banking reduces most of the transactional costs of banking). 
Another author identifies and describes four types of agent banking: 
1. POS-enabled bank agent – This is an agent managed by a bank that uses 
a payment card to identify customers. 
2. Mobile phone-enabled agent – This is an agent managed by a bank that 
uses a cell phone to identify customers. 
3. Mobile wallet – This is an agent that is often managed by a telecom, 
uses a cell phone to identify customers, and provides store-of-value 
accounts called mobile wallets that are backed by bank deposits. 
Customers can use mobile wallets to send, receive, and store electronic 
monetary value. For this analysis, we consider them a store of value 
account that provides a useful comparison for a savings account directly 
provided by a financial institution. 
4. Bank-provided account linked to a mobile wallet – This is a bank 
account that is linked to a mobile wallet. The bank does not manage the 
agent and pays a fee to the telecom for deposits and withdrawals. 
CLAIRE VENIARD, HOW AGENT BANKING CHANGES THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL ACCOUNTS 1–2 
(2010), https://docs.gatesfoundation.org/Documents/agent-banking.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/HW8W-C3FZ]. 
239 See Henry Thomas Mwangi Maina &Willy Mwangi Muturi, Factors Influencing the 
Uptake of Agency Banking Services by Customers in Commercial Bank in Kenya: A Case of 
Kenya Commercial Bank, 2 STRATEGIC J. BUS. CHANGE & MGMT. 179, 181 (2014) 
(describing agency banking’s potential to increase financial services provided to lower 
income individuals who are not sufficiently reached by traditional bank branch networks). 
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and check cashers. In addition to cashing checks and processing bill 
payments, agent banks should have transactional operations, accepting 
deposits for checking and savings accounts.240 Banks can expand their 
profits as consumers become aware of the banks’ available products for 
credit, saving, and insurance.241   
An agent banking system, while most cost-effective for transactional 
accounts with low balance and frequent transactions, offers advantages for 
both the fringe bank consumer and the financial institution. For the fringe 
bank consumer, location alone increases inclusivity.242 The convenience of 
less travel time to access banking services is important. Moreover, banking 
services in retail locations have flexible hours and are in a familiar, non-
threatening environment.243 Agent banking systems dramatically diminish 
rent, administration costs, and labor costs. In addition to the reduced 
infrastructure and customer costs, the financial institution incurs transaction 
costs only when a transaction occurs.244 Agent banks can also expect an 
increase in revenue and the high likelihood of a new customer segment.245   
Although an agent banking system is an optimal way to develop scale in 
financial inclusion, it has its disadvantages. Repeated incidences with the 
logistics of poor service could discourage consumer use. If locations are not 
 
240 Agent banking systems reach optimal profitability when consumers use mobile based 
agents and mobile wallets. See VENIARD, supra note 238, at 3 (discussing the cost-
effectiveness of transactional accounts for agent banking systems).  
241 Id.  
242 See Anjali Kumar et al., Accessing Financial Access in Brazil 24–26 (World Bank 
Working Paper No. 50, 2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINCLUSIVEFIN 
SYS/Resources/AccesstoFinancialServicesBrazil.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S35-MEAN]. 
243 See SAI KUMAR JAYANTY, AGENCY BANKING: NEW FRONTIERS IN FINANCIAL INCLUSION 3 
(2012) (discussing how agency banking has reduced costs even as it reaches new customers); 
CAITLIN SANFORD, DO AGENTS IMPROVE FINANCIAL INCLUSION? EVIDENCE FROM A NATIONAL 
SURVEY IN BRAZIL 15 (2013) (arguing that despite their convenience and accessibility, agent 
bank services are not of a good quality).  
244 Transaction costs make banking operations in underutilized locations extremely 
expensive given the fixed costs of operating a branch. On the other hand, given that the agent 
bank’s operating costs are fixed already, the agent bank is incentivized to operate as a 
financial services provider at full capacity because each transaction earns a commission. See 
VENIARD, supra note 238, at 3 (finding that total costs per deposit transaction are 
significantly higher if the delivery channel is a branch instead of an agent bank). 
245 While arguably agent banks can cross-sell financial products, a more effective strategy may 
require incurring additional marketing and sales costs. See Anjali Kumar et al., Expanding Bank 
Outreach Through Retail Partnerships: Correspondent Banking in Brazil 3–4 (World Bank, 
Working Paper No. 85, 2006), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en 
/912991468016248173/pdf/363980Retail0p101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/L7AN-TH2C] (showing how formal, regulated financial institutions have partnered 
with commercial entities to bring financial services to underserved communities and develop 
new sources of revenue). 
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secure or problems recur with network connectivity or equipment 
malfunctions, customers may also become dissatisfied.246 The failure to 
maintain liquidity or to meet the cash needs of customers could result in 
discontinued use.247 The increased regulatory requirements and more 
complex procedures and product offerings could increase the costs of 
operating an agent banking system.248 Agent banks hire their own employees. 
While financial institutions often adopt a corporate identity and culture to 
influence the customer experience, financial institutions cannot directly 
control the behavior of the agent bank’s employees. Thus, the behavior and 
conduct of the agent bank and its employees in providing the services could 
send a message of disinterest and dissuade customers from using agent banks. 
 
3. Agent banking and the payment system  
 
Payment systems ensure the circulation of money through a 
coordination of policies and procedures that facilitate the clearing and 
settlement of funds. The payments service market is composed of various 
arrangements that coordinate the production, processing and pricing of 
payment instruments, services and delivery.249 The payment infrastructure 
connects payment service providers and users through information service 
operators and technology providers.250  
Agent banking needs a robust competitive payment system in order 
to operate. Interoperability among payment systems means a system or 
product is compatible with other systems or products.251 Ideally, 
interoperability allows for seamless payment transfers regardless of country, 
bank, currency, or regulations.  
 
246 See Fred Gichana Atandi, Challenges of Agent Banking Experiences in Kenya, 3 INT’L. J. 
ACAD. RES. BUS. & SOC. SCI. 397, 399 (2013) (describing the potential barriers to agent 
banking implementation). 
247 Maina, supra note 239, at 181.  
248 See VENIARD, supra note 238, at 4. 
249 For a discussion of the role of central bank money in payment systems, see generally 
Disyatat , supra note 143.  
250 See generally id. 
251 In the United States, the automated clearing house system (ACH) has developed because 
of the involvement of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve Bank system has facilitated 
interoperability through effective regulation, an efficient, operational infrastructure, and 
using the ACH for government benefits and tax payments. The Electronic Payments Network 
also runs a part of the ACH Network. See Steve Mott, Can ACH and Image Convergence 
Succeed?, BAI BANKING STRATEGIES, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 1, 2; Processing Services, ELEC. 
PAYMENTS NETWORK, https://www.epaynetwork.com/cms/services/processing/001459.php 
(last accessed June 5, 2020); Fed. Res. Fin. Servs., FED. ACH OPERATIONS AND PROCESSING, 
https://www.frbservices.org/Retail/OperationsProcess.htm [https://perma.cc/CT 5Y-TMVE]. 
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The cooperative development of processes and technologies by 
banks, networks, processors, and other service providers has the advantage 
of being both cost-efficient and enhancing risk management.252 
Interoperability can also be achieved when mandated by regulations.253 By 
designing a simple and relatively inexpensive system and supporting state 
government use of the ACH system, the Federal Reserve made access to the 
national payment system less demanding. Using the dynamic retail payment 
market will require a balance between cooperation and competition. The 
mechanism for the clearing and settlement of relatively low-value payments 
means that communication service operators and other nonfinancial entities 
provide the services. As shown below, the benefit of a deeper, more 
diversified financial system is long-term financial stability making the 
potential costs of financial inclusion compensable. 
 
B. An Agent Banking Model for the U.S.  
 
A financial access agenda must balance the innovation and 
experimentation needed without compromising the safety and soundness of 
the banking system. The 2017 FDIC National Survey included information 
on the use of mobile banking by the underbanked and showed an increasing 
familiarity of mobile banking use for basic financial transactions.254  
Technology can permit banks to manage the differentiated customer model 
that fringe bank customers need profitably and safely. Agent banking allows 
banking beyond branches by providing access to banking through electronic 
transactions.255 Based on the success in emerging economies, a modified 
 
252 See Amelia H. Boss, Convergence in Electronic Banking: Technological Convergence, 
Systems Convergence, Legal Convergence, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 63, 91 (2009) (discussing the 
regulatory gaps in convergence and interoperability of payment platforms). 
253 Interoperability in payment systems is achieved when: 1) banks join a simple scheme, 
agreeing to be bound by rules set by that scheme, 2) network interoperability, connecting 
networks through a negotiated payment scheme and exchange agreement- often used for 
cross-border or cross-regional payments acceptance, 3) parallel system interoperability, 
allowing merchants or agents accepting payments from consumers to participate in multiple 
schemes. See Carol Coye Benson & Scott Loftesness, Interoperability in Electronic 
Payments: Lessons and Opportunities, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR (May 2013), 
https://www.cgap.org/research/publication/interoperability-electronic-payments-lessons-and-
opportunities [https://perma.cc/YP8D-EAKF] (describing three conditions for achieving 
interoperability in payment systems). 
254 More than two in five unbanked households already use mobile banking for basic financial 
transactions. 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 14. 
255 See Ignacio Mas, Shifting Branchless Banking Regulation from Enabling to Fostering 
Competition, 30 BANK. & FIN. L. REV. 179, 183–84 (2015) (discussing the need to curtail 
the barriers to entry while protecting the integrity and stability of branchless banking).  
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version of branchless banking might work in the United States. Relying on 
mobile connections, banking agents connect to financial institutions in real-
time, allowing banks to deliver transaction services through an intermediary 
more efficiently than delivering them directly. Banks can create wide-
reaching branchless channels that use cards and point-of-sale (POS) 
devices.256 This solution addresses the high costs and lack of proximity that 
exclude so many from access to the formal banking sector.257  
The most significant feature of this model is that the financial 
products should be transformational. The mobile financial products offered 
should be based on research that integrates innovation with features that the 
unbanked need to access the banking economy. Products that are made 
specifically for fringe bank consumers consider their need for cash, no float 
requirements, and small dollar loans. These mobile banking products should 
 
This discussion distinguishes agent and branchless banking, which provides financial services 
digitally from Fintech companies. While both use electronic transactions, branchless banking 
is a platform offered by banks that allows customers to access cash or accounts through mobile 
phones using Internet connectivity. See ANNABEL SCHIFF & MIKE MCCAFFREY, REDESIGNING 
DIGITAL FINANCE FOR BIG DATA 5–6 (2017), https://www.ssrn.com/ abstract=2967122 
[https://perma.cc/X4ZG-CRJY]. It helps the unbanked by providing electronic access to a bank 
account, and allows customers to contract for new services, such as loans, insurance, or 
certificates of deposit. Fintech companies are technology companies that provide access to the 
payment system through banks. Id. It refers to using a mobile device to access information from 
or send information to an existing bank account. Id.  It is beneficial to banked customers, but 
not to the unbanked.   
256 Several central banks have adopted this model. For example, the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) uses business facilitators and business correspondents. Agents under this model 
function similar to the way correspondent agents function under the model used by the 
Central Bank of Brazil. Correspondent agents provide a wide array of services, including 
disbursing small-value credit, collecting loan payments, performing small-value remittances 
and selling credit. Those regulations also authorize transactional agents, who engage in bill 
payments, withdrawals, and transfers. See generally, Guidelines for Engaging of Business 
Correspondents, RES. BANK OF INDIA, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/bs_viewcontent.aspx? 
Id=2234#A3 [https://perma.cc/WRR2-3KSU] (last accessed May 19, 2020). 
257 Agent or “branchless banking” is 19% cheaper than traditional banking because of the lower 
overhead expenditures. CLAUDIA MCKAY & MARK PICKENS, BRANCHLESS BANKING 2010: 
WHO’S SERVED? AT WHAT PRICE? WHAT’S NEXT? 5 (2010), https://www.cgap.org/sites 
/default/files/researches/documents/CGAP-Focus-Note-Branchless-Banking-2010-Who-Is-
Served-At-What-Price-What-Is-Next-Sep-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQN8-94XS]. In a recent 
study, the Federal Reserve Board studied consumers’ use of mobile technology to access 
financial services and make financial decisions. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., 
CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 1 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov 
/econres data/mobile-devices/files/consumers-and-mobile-financial-services-report-201603.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P3P9-J3VT] (finding that the use of mobile payment activities was lower than 
the use of mobile banking). 
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be distinguished from those mobile banking products developed and 
marketed for the bank’s general population.258  
The similarities in the operations of banks and agent bank retailers 
speak to the needs of fringe bank consumers. First, agent bank retailers will 
offer identical services as check cashers.259  Familiarity and the absence of 
stigma are among the reasons that many underserved consumers use check 
cashing outlets. With numerous agent bank retailers presumably available 
throughout a community, the consumer chooses the preferred retailer, thereby 
encouraging participation and frequent use. The fact that many retail 
establishments already cash checks makes this idea even more cogent. 
Second, consumers will experience greater efficiency in banking 
services. Agent bank retailers will become transaction centers, handling the 
routine transactions usually conducted at a branch, e.g., deposits, withdrawals, 
balance inquiries, transfers, and account registration. This change gives 
consumers access to a wider selection of services than check cashers can 
legally provide. Consumers will benefit from lower transaction costs with the 
accumulated costs of check cashing and money order purchases removed.260 
They are also encouraged to save. After depositing a paycheck, bill payments 
can be debited from an account with a balance remaining to withdraw later. 
Depositing funds in a bank reduces the risk of theft for consumers.  
Prudential regulation of banking makes using a “bank-centric” model 
optimal. A bank develops its own mobile-banking platform to assess the 
payment system that its agents use.261 The role that banks play in the payment 
system provides a strategic advantage and also generates revenue. Using the 
 
258 See Ahmed Dermish et al., Branchless and Mobile Banking Solutions for the Poor: A Survey 
of the Literature, 6 INNOVATIONS 81, 84 (2011) (discussing the feasibility and utility of 
branchless and mobile banking); see also DAVID PORTEOUS, JUST HOW TRANSFORMATIONAL IS 
M-BANKING? 9–10 (2007), http://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-pa 
per-just-how-transformational-is-m-banking-feb-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/GNX2-4W2U] 
(discussing how mobile banking has altered the banking landscape, especially with regard to 
accessing basic banking accounts in South Africa). 
259 Agent bank retailers will offer this service as a convenience, but not necessarily for a 
lower price. See Rubin, supra note 28, at 232 (positing that the proliferation of check cashing 
outlets in low-income neighborhood makes the pricing competitive).  
260 Id.  
261 Id.at 220–21. Due to the lack of regulation and supervision of nonfinancial institutions, a 
branchless banking model based on nonfinancial institutions providing financial services is not 
recommended.  Non-financial institutions, such as fintech companies, are subject to OCC 
regulations, but as discussed above, supra note 255, those technology platforms are not a 
solution to the problem of the unbanked because they require customers to have bank accounts. 
One commentator prefers “banking beyond bank branches” because of the specialized banking 
channels that develop. See Claire Alexandre, Ignacio Mas & Daniel Radcliffe, Regulating New 
Banking Models to Bring Financial Services to All, 54 CHALLENGE 116, 123 (2011) (arguing 
that existing branching restrictions and branch regulations should be modified).  
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bank’s branding, agent bank retailers who are geographically dispersed reach a 
wider customer base. The agent bank retailers pay the bank to offer transaction 
services making these services more cost-efficient for both the customer and the 
bank.262 The lack of dependence on a telecommunications company means more 
control and more profit for the bank. It also assures intuitional solvency and 
fiscal stability because of the applicable banking regulations.263 
Regulatory classifications will determine the functions and services. 
Agent banks can provide essential services, including check cashing services, 
bill payments, withdrawals, and transfers.264 They could also identify 
borrowers, collect and submit account and loan applications, therefore 
verifying and doing preliminarily process data.265  
The account structure will limit the principal bank’s liability. The 
agent bank retailers’ deposit-taking is designed so that it is merely an inter-
account transfer, which does not increase the liabilities of the banking system. 
To limit the bank’s credit exposure, the agent bank should be required to pre-
purchase electronic value from the principal bank.266 A customer’s cash 
deposit will result in an immediate transfer of an equivalent electronic value 
from the store’s account to the customers’ account. Provided that the bank 
authorizes the transaction in real time, no financial risks arise from the store’s 
 
262 The integration of “[t]he value of data integrated to a live registration, underwriting and 
onboarding process is a prime example of how solution providers can bring improved 
efficiency and KYC elements to financial institutions while enhancing the service delivery 
for their merchants and reselling partners.” Richard McShirley, Innovation: Bank Centric 
Payments, BANKNEWS (Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.banknews.com/blog/innovation-bank-
centric-payments/ [https://perma.cc/G8P9-KTP8]. 
263 A bank-centric model is characterized as one where the “the bank leads the chain.” See 
Senthe, supra note 234, at 19. In addition to the bank-led model of mobile banking, there are 
several other ways to implement agent banking. These include: 1) mobile network operators 
(MNOs), i.e., the teleco-led model, a partnership with telecommunications carriers and 
technological companies; 2) microfinance institutions (MFIs) which can serve as financial 
institutions; 3) MFIs acting as agents for commercial financial institutions; and 4) the 
“consortium model,” comprised of private and public sector members, such as MFIs, 
technology, and financial groups. Id. at 17–21. 
264 For example, an agent bank would perform a “cash-in cash-out function” when a customer 
cashes a check. The agent bank debits its account at its bank and credits the customer’s 
account at the agent bank. Providing “cash in/cash out” service is a ‘deposit-taking’ activity 
requiring regulatory compliance. 12 U.S.C. 1813(l) (2018).  
265 The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) imposes customer due diligence on financial institutions as 
a way of combating illicit financial activity and traditional financial crimes, including money 
laundering, fraud, and tax evasion. The corresponding “Know Your Customer” (KYC) 
regulation requires banks verify customers who open new accounts. See 31 C.F.R. 
1010.100(e) (2019). While agent bank retailers could assist with this function, arguably there 
should be less stringent KYC requirements for low-dollar transactions.  
266 The bank is able to limit its liability because of the pre-paid account but only if the 
transactions are authorized in real time by the bank. 
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handling of the deposit.267 By exchanging the customer’s cash for an equivalent 
deposit into the prepaid account, the retailer never holds any financial assets 
that belong to either the customer or the bank. What appears to be the taking 
of a deposit is merely a cash swap.268 Using mobile technology, customers 
are able to immediately see their accounts credited securely, thereby reducing 
any risk. Banks can serve those previously underserved due to the small or 
zero profit margin and develop a viable market segment.269 
Small-dollar bank accounts established through an agent bank retailer 
raise issues of how to protect them. The funds are not bank deposits nor stored 
in the customer’s name. Regulations should require fund custodians to store 
an equivalent amount in a bank account or pooled trust accounts. Investments 
should be in low-risk liquid assets and restrict the use of the electronically 
stored-value sums.270 
The branchless banking infrastructure is critical in order to mitigate 
operational and technological risks. To the extent that branchless banking uses 
mobile banking platforms, it is subject to telecommunications and financial 
regulation.271 Banking regulations have explicit rules regarding reporting, 
ownership,272 and deposit pooling limitations273 that agent bank retailers will 
need to comply with or modify. Specifically, agent banking regulations need to 
define the delivery channels and provide for license and registration 
 
267 See Claire Alexandre et al., Regulating New Banking Models to Bring Financial Services 
to All, 54 CHALLENGE 116, 132 (2011). 
268  As the authors explain: 
Viewed in this light, the store is not acting as an agent for the bank in the 
legal/economic sense: the store is its own principal. The store acts as a cash 
merchant, offering cash in/out services because it sees a revenue-
generating opportunity from leveraging its own bank account. The store is 
more of a value-added reseller of the bank’s service – a super-user that 
uses its account to take the other side of a customer’s transaction (i.e. either 
cash for e-money, or vice versa). 
Id. at 125. 
269 See Alberto Chaia et al., A New Idea in Banking for the Poor, MCKINSEY & CO. (Nov. 10, 
2010), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/a-new-idea-in-
banking-for-the-poor [https://perma.cc/4K8Q-C2PA] (proposing that, “[b]y teaming up with 
retail outlets in low-income, often hard-to-reach areas, financial institutions can create value 
both for themselves and their new customers”). 
270 See generally KATE LAUER, DENISE DIAS & MICHAEL TARAZI, BANK AGENTS: RISK 
MANAGEMENT, MITIGATION, AND SUPERVISION (2011), http://www.cgap.org/sites/default 
/files/researches/documents/Focus-Note-Bank-Agents-Risk-Management-Mitigation-andSuper 
vision-Dec-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE8A-VBJU] (discussing challenges of regulating agent 
bank investments.) 
271 Senthe, supra note 234, at 12–20 (discussing generally how microfinance banking 
requires an interaction between technology and banking regulations).  
272 12 C.F.R. § 330.6-339.13 (2018). 
273 12 C.F.R. § 32.3 (2018). 
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procedures.274 The deposit taking activity needs capital adequacy requirements 
which will set minimum capital thresholds.275 Regulations could dictate different 
levels of licensing and registration based on the nature of the deposit-taking 
entity, account balance limits or channels through which deposits are taken.  
Oversight policies for a safe and efficient payments system balance 
the trade-offs between financial stability, efficiency, and soundness.276 The 
stability and integrity of the financial system requires regulators to address 
the prudential concerns of consumer protection; the security and efficiency 
of the payments system; as well as data security, privacy, and accessibility. 
Regulations will be needed to determine agent suitability and licensing. 
Those regulations should discuss compliance and risk management functions, 
including liquidity management, as well as procedures and how agents will 
be staffed, monitored and renewed.277  
Using agent bank retailers may bring new consumer protection risks. 
Regulation in this area must meet the difficult goal of promoting innovation 
while simultaneously protecting consumer interests. Creation of effective 
new products requires customers to perceive them as trustworthy and fair. 
The risk to consumers arising from loss of payment instruments, fraudulent 
transactions, and entity theft raise common supervisory concerns that may 
need to be addressed.278 Although a number of nonfinancial providers are 
involved in agent banking, e.g. mobile phone companies and agent retailers, 
 
274 Although most agent banking is done through mobile phones or retail agents, the FTC, 
which regulates unfair trade practices, does not have regulatory authority over mobile 
banking. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018) (providing that the FTC’s jurisdiction does not extend 
to “banks” or “savings and loans institutions”). For additional background on the new 
opportunities in mobile banking created by information and communications technology, see 
generally Michael Klein & Colin Mayer, Mobile Banking and Financial Inclusion: The 
Regulatory Lessons (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5664, 2011), 
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/516511468161352996/pdf/WPS5664.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JK5T-5CMZ].  
275   Implementing the proposals recommended in this Article requires changing the structure 
of insured deposit accounts. The FDIC, as the regulator of depository institutions, arguably 
would have appropriate regulations for the supervision of these entities.   
276 See Malaguti, supra note 29, at 1–2 (asking, “how can regulators balance the creation of 
an inclusive payments system with maintaining its stability, integrity, and safety?”). 
277 Banking regulators need access to all data on the agent. Agent banks will be subject to 
reporting, inspection, and examination to assess and monitor. Regulators should require 
banks to seek approval before any major operational or infrastructure change. Onsite 
inspection of a bank is planned based on the materiality of operations or the risk assessment 
conducted through offsite monitoring. See LAUER ET AL., supra note 270, at 1–12.  
278 DANIEL LOZANO ET AL., A NEW AGENT MODEL FOR BRANCHLESS BANKING IN COLOMBIA 
9–11 (2010) (discussing traditional banks and branchless banking).  
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those providers would be subject to existing transparency and disclosure 
requirements for consumer financial transactions.279 
Finally, identifying and keeping track of the specific tasks that agent 
bank retailers perform is also critical for determining financial inclusion. 
Specifically, significant financial measures include the number of agent bank 
retailers,  the percentage of the principal bank’s business and the activities 
(as measured by principal’s assets or revenues or profits), the percentage of 
the loan portfolio handled by agent bank retailers, and the number and 
aggregate size of all transactions handled by the agent bank retailers.  
In using the branchless banking model, agent banking can impact 
financial inclusion positively for both consumers and banks. Access to 
affordable financial services benefits fringe bank consumers, who have a 
more secure environment to manage their financial lives. The benefits of 
financial inclusion to the economy as a whole raises the issue of the central 
bank’s responsibility to ensure access to the formal banking sector. 
 
C. Federal Reserve Policy and Financial Inclusion     
 
Central banks have the dual objectives of promoting and maintaining a 
safe and efficient payment system and providing access to it. Central banking 
arguably creates a social contract between the banking system, regulators, and 
the government. As discussed above, the involvement of central banks in the 
global economic crisis reflects a “seamless” banking system and is fundamental 
to a well-functioning financial system.280 Central bank intervention is required 
to promote financial stability, which is enhanced when every citizen has 
access to the payment system. 
 
279 CFPB has jurisdiction over “service providers” and “covered persons.” See Adam J. 
Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 321, 344–47 (2013). Covered persons are defined as “any person that engages in 
offering or providing a consumer financial product or service and any affiliate of a [covered 
person] if such affiliate acts as a service provider to such person.” 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) 
(2018). Service provider “means any person that provides a material service to a covered 
person in connection with the offering or provision by such covered person of a consumer 
financial product or service . . .” Id. at § 5481(26). Consumer transactions, which would 
include agent banking, fall within the defined scope of “consumer financial products or 
services,” as long as the service “is offered or provided for use by consumers primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes" or certain ancillary services provided in connection 
with the offering or provision of a consumer financial product.” See Levitin, supra note 279, 
at 345. Therefore, at a minimum, agent bank retailers must comply with CFPB regulations. 
Thus, consumers engaging with agent bank retailers will have consumer protection at the 
federal level. 
280 See discussion, supra Subsection III.A.3. 
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The distributive effects of financial sector regulation regarding bank 
access needs greater clarity and focus. Access to financial services, the safe 
transfer of funds, and monetary exchange all occur though payment and 
settlement systems. Undoubtedly, the Federal Reserve’s role in maintaining 
economic stability is a critical one; equally important is the Federal Reserve’s 
role in regulating the financial sector to alleviate inequality in the larger 
economy. The failure to develop an inclusive financial infrastructure increases 
risk; stymies’ economic development; and has negative consequences on the 
fiscal competitiveness of individuals, communities, and small businesses. 
 
1. Tax Incentives for Inclusionary Banking  
 
An inclusive economy requires that every citizen has access to 
financial products and services that are that useful and cost-effective. The 
payments system is the gateway to financial inclusion. As discussed above, 
the Federal Reserve has a strong interest in maintaining a safe and efficient 
payment system that will help support economic activity and promote the 
smooth implementation of monetary policy.281 The fundamentals of financial 
inclusion, fair access to the market, a level playing field, support for 
innovation, and some level of interoperability are the same for the payment 
system. The question becomes how to implement these parallel objectives. 
Tax legislation is commonly used to achieve social or economic 
goals. A fundamental premise of tax policy is the provision of public goods 
and services. A tax incentive is way of instituting a policy without a direct 
governmental expenditure, sometimes described as a “small economic 
footprint” that does not disrupt market forces.282  
The new delivery channels for financial products and services as 
proposed in this Article require leveraging developments in mobile 
technology. Financial institutions that offer transaction accounts to fringe 
bank consumers may need tax incentives or credits to defray the costs of 
providing traditional banking services.283  
 
281 See infra Subsection III.A.3. 
282 Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975, 977 (2011) 
(defining tax subsidies as “tax laws that offer special tax deductions, credits, and other tax 
benefits designed to accomplish public policy goals”). Although often lauded as a way to 
achieve social equity, one commentator questions whether tax incentives are reviewed for 
effectiveness. See generally Richard Krever, Analysing Implicit Tax Expenditures, 35 
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 427 (2011) (positing that indirect tax subsidies and incentives should 
be evaluated as rigorously as explicit tax spending for their benefits).   
283 No federal law requires banks to offer basic bank accounts. The Dodd-Frank Act 
authorized Treasury to implement a program of grants to “enable low- and moderate-income 
individuals to establish one or more accounts in a federally insured depository institution.” 
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Existing law allows national banks to make investments that are 
primarily designed to promote the public welfare and that primarily 
benefit LMI individuals and LMI areas.284 This incentive alone could 
encourage bank agent retailers and thereby further financial inclusion.  
However, allowing a financial inclusion tax incentive for banks 
that provide LMI bank accounts implicitly encourages banks to act in the 
public interest. It is an additional way of recognizing that affordable 
access to the payment system is a public good. A financial inclusion tax 
incentive would target LMI accounts while relying on the banks’ voluntary 
cooperation to implement this regulatory goal.285  
A financial inclusion tax incentive is a more feasible alternative 
than the direct spending required for postal banking. First, postal banking 
requires the government to create a separate, costly financial services 
infrastructure to handle LMI bank accounts. Second, postal banking 
necessitates the postal service developing competence and expertise in 
financial services. Conversely, a financial inclusion tax incentive absorbs 
some of the costs of providing LMI bank accounts; it also offers a viable 
option to banks willing to partner with the government to provide a 
government-sponsored banking service.   
 
2. Annual Reporting 
 
The objective of financial inclusion policy is to integrate the 
unbanked into the formal financial economy. Formal financial services are 
costly for both banks and the underserved. The small volume of cash that 
fringe bank customers circulate makes providing formal banking services 
 
12 U.S.C. § 5623 (2018). The FDIC initiated a pilot program, FDIC Model Safe Accounts, 
that encouraged banks to offer low fee transactional accounts that disallowed checks and 
overdraft transactions. Although the economic feasibility for banks of offering the accounts 
was not reported, some of the participating banks reported the marginal costs of the accounts 
was low.  FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC MODEL SAFE ACCOUNTS PILOT: FINAL REPORT 7 
(2012), http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/template/SafeAccountsFinalReport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/68CA-YQ5Y].  
284 The National Bank Act gives banks this investment authority and also authorizes 
investments in areas targeted by a government entity for redevelopment. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 
(2018) (“Eleventh. To make investments directly or indirectly. . . .”); 12 C.F.R. § 24 (2018) 
(implementing the regulation). Banks are also eligible for a “qualified investment” tax credit 
as defined under the CRA. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.23 (2018). 
285 Eligibility for the tax incentive should be based on specified guidelines. For example, 
Massachusetts state law requires state-chartered banks to provide certain consumers with no 
cost checking and savings accounts that meet definitive guidelines regarding available 
transactions and services. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.167D, § 2 (2019). 
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inefficient for most large banks. Fringe banking is convenient, but expensive 
with no savings or credit history component.  
Financial inclusion is measured biennially in the United States, yet, 
for fringe bank consumers, a need remains to increase affordable, secure 
access to payment services. The specific financial inclusion challenge faced 
in the U.S. is providing competitive, low-cost bank accounts for LMI 
consumers who are unable to maintain minimum account balances rather than 
access to non-competitive, higher priced payment services.  
As argued above, failure to correct financial exclusion is a negative 
statement about the value of economic inclusion in this country.286  It also 
forestalls the economic spillover when cash-based transactions are counted 
in the economy. The importance of financial inclusion for economic 
development requires crafting a national strategy to address specific 
challenges and achieve specific goals. Although this national priority is 
commonplace in developing countries, and usually is implemented by their 
central banks, the United States has not made a serious commitment to 
financial inclusion  
Banks should report and be specifically graded on financial inclusion 
as a part of the yearly CRA assessment. Currently, the lack of data makes it 
difficult to accurately assess what banks are doing to bring fringe bank 
consumers in their communities into the formal banking sector.  Among the 
factors relevant to the CRA service test is the availability and effectiveness 
of alternative systems for delivering retail banking services in LMI 
geographies and to LMI individuals.287 While banks receive CRA points for 
providing low-cost checking and savings accounts, no data on the number of 
accounts offered and the income of the customers is required. In addition, 
CRA exams should assess whether the accounts are affordable in terms of 
overdraft protection and high fees that make the accounts too expensive for 
LMI consumers. This focused reporting allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of how banks are performing in the LMI markets.  
Financial inclusion requires a competitive banking system, with 
institutions designed to serve the particular needs of LMI consumers. These 
proposals encourage the Federal Reserve, as the nation’s central bank, to take 
affirmative steps to embrace its mandate and ensure equitable, sustainable, 
access to the payment system for all Americans. 
 
 
 
286 See supra Section II.A. 
287 See 12 C.F.R. § 345.24(d) (2019) (providing performance criteria for retail banking 
services).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Two fundamental market failures—bank concertation and the low 
quality of the fringe banking industry—apply distinctively to financial 
exclusion. Balancing costs with access is the conundrum that banks face. Yet, a 
stable economy requires a competitive banking system, with institutions deigned 
to serve the particular needs of LMI persons. Additionally, allowing the informal 
banking sector to monopolize providing financial services to LMI consumers is 
a choice that furthers income and economic inequality. Instead, the United States 
should consider branchless banking—the regulatory approach adopted in several 
developing countries. The change would contribute to addressing the non-
competitiveness and market failures of the fringe banking industry. 
 The banking regulatory framework can remove structural barriers that 
constrain access by investing in financial infrastructure where fringe bank 
consumers live and work. Using mobile payment platforms and existing retail 
stores agents, a new delivery channel can provide access with lower transaction 
costs for both banks and consumers.  
 Policies that enable banks to contract with nonbank retail agents to 
provide financial services have proven highly successful in advancing financial 
inclusion where bank branches are not economically viable. With technology 
reducing the costs and risks of these financial transactions, banks and retail 
businesses, acting as bank agents, can enter into a viable, cost-effective and 
useful strategic partnership.   
 Branchless banking presents significant regulatory and supervisory 
challenges. Regulation in this area must meet the difficult goal of promoting 
innovation while simultaneously protecting consumer interests.  The proposal 
leverages existing retail infrastructure as delivery channels and bank agents. 
Substantial concerns for consumers include timely transaction settlement to 
minimize fraud and simplified account opening procedures. Increased regulatory 
guidance and oversight will require inter-operability to allow consumers to 
operate across networks and prevent larger agent bank retailers from dominating 
the market. Guidance on how to structure the legal frameworks that govern the 
relationship of the financial institution with the agent is also critical.  
 Despite the foregoing, branchless banking holds great promise for fringe 
bank consumers and if the concerns noted herein are effectively addressed, the 
collaboration between retail establishments and insured financial institutions 
may have the ability to influence how fringe bank consumers access the formal 
banking economy.  
